Biblio
Massive multiple-input multiple-output (mMIMO) with perfect channel state information (CSI) can lead array power gain increments proportional to the number of antennas. Despite this fact constrains on power amplification still exist due to envelope variations of high order constellation signals. These constrains can be overpassed by a transmitter with several amplification branches, with each one associated to a component signal that results from the decomposition of a multilevel constellation as a sum of several quasi constant envelope signals that are sent independently. When combined with antenna arrays at the end of each amplification branch the security improves due to the energy separation achieved by beamforming. However, to avoid distortion on the signal resulting from the combination of all components at channel level all the beams of signal components should be directed in same direction. In such conditions it is crucial to assess the impact of misalignments between beams associated to each user, which is the purpose of this work. The set of results presented here show the good tolerance against misalignments of these transmission structures.
This paper considers a pilot spoofing attack scenario in a massive MIMO system. A malicious user tries to disturb the channel estimation process by sending interference symbols to the base-station (BS) via the uplink. Another legitimate user counters by sending random symbols. The BS does not possess any partial channel state information (CSI) and distribution of symbols sent by malicious user a priori. For such scenario, this paper aims to separate the channel directions from the legitimate and malicious users to the BS, respectively. A blind channel separation algorithm based on estimating the characteristic function of the distribution of the signal space vector is proposed. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm provides good channel separation performance in a typical massive MIMO system.
Most two-factor authentication (2FA) implementations rely on the user possessing and interacting with a secondary device (e.g. mobile phone) which has contributed to the lack of widespread uptake. We present a 2FA system, called Wi-Sign that does not rely on a secondary device for establishing the second factor. The user is required to sign at a designated place on the primary device with his finger following a successful first step of authentication (i.e. username + password). Wi-Sign captures the unique perturbations in the WiFi signals incurred due to the hand motion while signing and uses these to establish the second factor. Wi-Sign detects these perturbations by measuring the fine-grained Channel State Information (CSI) of the ambient WiFi signals at the device from which log-in attempt is being made. The logic is that, the user's hand geometry and the way he moves his hand while signing cause unique perturbations in CSI time-series. After filtering noise from the CSI data, principal component analysis is employed for compressing the CSI data. For segmentation of sign related perturbations, Wi-Sign utilizes the thresholding approach based on the variance of the first-order difference of the selected principal component. Finally, the authentication decision is made by feeding scrupulously selected features to a One-Class SVM classifier. We implement Wi-Sign using commodity off-the-shelf 802.11n devices and evaluate its performance by recruiting 14 volunteers. Our evaluation shows that Wi-Sign can on average achieve 79% TPR. Moreover, Wi-Sign can detect attacks with an average TNR of 86%.
This paper proposed a MIMO cross-layer precoding secure communications via pattern controlled by higher layer cryptography. By contrast to physical layer security system, the proposed scheme could enhance the security in adverse situations where the physical layer security hardly to be deal with. Two One typical situation is considered. One is that the attackers have the ideal CSI and another is eavesdropper's channel are highly correlated to legitimate channel. Our scheme integrates the upper layer with physical layer secure together to gaurantee the security in real communication system. Extensive theoretical analysis and simulations are conducted to demonstrate its effectiveness. The proposed method is feasible to spread in many other communicate scenarios.
We consider the block Rayleigh fading multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channel with no prior channel state information (CSI) available at any of the terminals. The channel gains remain constant in a coherence time of T symbols, and then change to another independent realization. The transmitter, the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper have nt, nr and ne antennas, respectively. We determine the exact secure degrees of freedom (s.d.o.f.) of this system when T ≥ 2 min(nt, nr). We show that, in this case, the s.d.o.f. is exactly (min(nt, nr) - ne)+(T - min(nt, nr))/T. The first term can be interpreted as the eavesdropper with ne antennas taking away ne antennas from both the transmitter and the legitimate receiver. The second term can be interpreted as a fraction of s.d.o.f. being lost due to the lack of CSI at the legitimate receiver. In particular, the fraction loss, min(nt, nr)/T, can be interpreted as the fraction of channel uses dedicated to training the legitimate receiver for it to learn its own CSI. We prove that this s.d.o.f. can be achieved by employing a constant norm channel input, which can be viewed as a generalization of discrete signalling to multiple dimensions.