| Title | Cyber – Transparencies, Assurance and Deterrence |
| Publication Type | Conference Paper |
| Year of Publication | 2012 |
| Authors | Atkinson, Simon Reay, Walker, David, Beaulne, Kevin, Hossain, Liaquat |
| Conference Name | 2012 International Conference on Cyber Security |
| Keywords | collaboration by social influence, collaborative influence, conceptual-design paper, Control, coordination by rule and control, CRC, cross disciplinary research strands, CSI, cyber-deterrence, cyber-ecology, cyber-scape, cyber-sûréte, deterrence, deterrence-escalator, Ecology, fail-safe supervisory control and data acquisition system, Human Behavior, influence, ontologies (artificial intelligence), Ontology, pubcrawl, resilience, safe-to-fail ecology, SCADA, Scalability, security of data, social trusts, socio-info-techno, state-based threat analysis, technological controls, threat equation, transparencies, Trusted Computing, trusts, warning time |
| Abstract | Cyber-has often been considered as a coordination and control, as opposed to collaborative influence, media. This conceptual-design paper, uniquely, builds upon a number of entangled, cross disciplinary research strands - integrating engineering and conflict studies - and a detailed literature review to propose a new paradigm of assurance and deterrence models. We consider an ontology for Cyber-surete, which combines both the social trusts necessary for [knowledge &, information] assurance such as collaboration by social influence (CSI) and the technological controls and rules for secure information management referred as coordination by rule and control (CRC). We posit Cyber-surete as enabling both a 'safe-to-fail' ecology (in which learning, testing and adaptation can take place) within a fail-safe supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA type) system, e.g. in a nuclear power plant. Building upon traditional state-based threat analysis, we consider Warning Time and the Threat equation with relation to policies for managing Cyber-Deterrence. We examine how the goods of Cyber-might be galvanised so as to encourage virtuous behaviour and deter and / or dissuade ne'er-do-wells through multiple transparencies. We consider how the Deterrence-escalator may be managed by identifying both weak influence and strong control signals so as to create a more benign and responsive cyber-ecology, in which strengths can be exploited and weaknesses identified. Finally, we consider declaratory / mutual transparencies as opposed to legalistic / controlled transparency. |
| DOI | 10.1109/CyberSecurity.2012.22 |
| Citation Key | atkinson_cyber_2012 |
Cyber – Transparencies, Assurance and Deterrence