Hutto, Kevin, Grijalva, Santiago, Mooney, Vincent.
2022.
Hardware-Based Randomized Encoding for Sensor Authentication in Power Grid SCADA Systems. 2022 IEEE Texas Power and Energy Conference (TPEC). :1–6.
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are utilized extensively in critical power grid infrastructures. Modern SCADA systems have been proven to be susceptible to cyber-security attacks and require improved security primitives in order to prevent unwanted influence from an adversarial party. One section of weakness in the SCADA system is the integrity of field level sensors providing essential data for control decisions at a master station. In this paper we propose a lightweight hardware scheme providing inferred authentication for SCADA sensors by combining an analog to digital converter and a permutation generator as a single integrated circuit. Through this method we encode critical sensor data at the time of sensing, so that unencoded data is never stored in memory, increasing the difficulty of software attacks. We show through experimentation how our design stops both software and hardware false data injection attacks occurring at the field level of SCADA systems.
Alimi, Oyeniyi Akeem, Ouahada, Khmaies, Abu-Mahfouz, Adnan M., Rimer, Suvendi, Alimi, Kuburat Oyeranti Adefemi.
2022.
Supervised learning based intrusion detection for SCADA systems. 2022 IEEE Nigeria 4th International Conference on Disruptive Technologies for Sustainable Development (NIGERCON). :1–5.
Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems play pivotal role in the operation of modern critical infrastructures (CIs). Technological advancements, innovations, economic trends, etc. have continued to improve SCADA systems effectiveness and overall CIs’ throughput. However, the trends have also continued to expose SCADA systems to security menaces. Intrusions and attacks on SCADA systems can cause service disruptions, equipment damage or/and even fatalities. The use of conventional intrusion detection models have shown trends of ineffectiveness due to the complexity and sophistication of modern day SCADA attacks and intrusions. Also, SCADA characteristics and requirement necessitate exceptional security considerations with regards to intrusive events’ mitigations. This paper explores the viability of supervised learning algorithms in detecting intrusions specific to SCADA systems and their communication protocols. Specifically, we examine four supervised learning algorithms: Random Forest, Naïve Bayes, J48 Decision Tree and Sequential Minimal Optimization-Support Vector Machines (SMO-SVM) for evaluating SCADA datasets. Two SCADA datasets were used for evaluating the performances of our approach. To improve the classification performances, feature selection using principal component analysis was used to preprocess the datasets. Using prominent classification metrics, the SVM-SMO presented the best overall results with regards to the two datasets. In summary, results showed that supervised learning algorithms were able to classify intrusions targeted against SCADA systems with satisfactory performances.
ISSN: 2377-2697
Szatkowski, Justin Michael, Li, Yan, Du, Liang.
2022.
Enabling Reconfigurable Naval SCADA Network through Software-Defined Networking. 2022 IEEE Transportation Electrification Conference & Expo (ITEC). :214–218.
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) technique is presented in this paper to manage the Naval Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) network for equipping the network with the function of reconfiguration and scalability. The programmable nature of SDN enables a programmable Modular Topology Generator (MTG), which provides an extensive control over the network’s internal connectivity and traffic control. Specifically, two functions of MTG are developed and examined in this paper, namely linkHosts and linkSwitches. These functions are able to place the network into three different states, i.e., fully connected, fully disconnected, and partially connected. Therefore, it provides extensive security benefits and allows network administrators to dynamically reconfigure the network and adjust settings according to the network’s needs. Extensive tests on Mininet have demonstrated the effectiveness of SDN for enabling the reconfigurable and scalable Naval SCADA network. Therefore, it provides a potent tool to enhance the resiliency/survivability, scalability/compatibility, and security of naval SCADA networks.
ISSN: 2377-5483
Chen, Yenan, Li, Linsen, Zhu, Zhaoqian, Wu, Yue.
2022.
Work-in-Progress: Reliability Evaluation of Power SCADA System with Three-Layer IDS. 2022 International Conference on Compilers, Architecture, and Synthesis for Embedded Systems (CASES). :1–2.
The SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) has become ubiquitous in industrial control systems. However, it may be exposed to cyber attack threats when it accesses the Internet. We propose a three-layer IDS (Intrusion Detection System) model, which integrates three main functions: access control, flow detection and password authentication. We use the reliability test system IEEE RTS-79 to evaluate the reliability. The experimental results provide insights into the establishment of the power SCADA system reliability enhancement strategies.
ISSN: 2643-1726
Kaura, Cheerag, Sindhwani, Nidhi, Chaudhary, Alka.
2022.
Analysing the Impact of Cyber-Threat to ICS and SCADA Systems. 2022 International Mobile and Embedded Technology Conference (MECON). :466–470.
The aim of this paper is to examine noteworthy cyberattacks that have taken place against ICS and SCADA systems and to analyse them. This paper also proposes a new classification scheme based on the severity of the attack. Since the information revolution, computers and associated technologies have impacted almost all aspects of daily life, and this is especially true of the industrial sector where one of the leading trends is that of automation. This widespread proliferation of computers and computer networks has also made it easier for malicious actors to gain access to these systems and networks and carry out harmful activities.
Urooj, Beenish, Ullah, Ubaid, Shah, Munam Ali, Sikandar, Hira Shahzadi, Stanikzai, Abdul Qarib.
2022.
Risk Assessment of SCADA Cyber Attack Methods: A Technical Review on Securing Automated Real-time SCADA Systems. 2022 27th International Conference on Automation and Computing (ICAC). :1–6.
The world’s most important industrial economy is particularly vulnerable to both external and internal threats, such as the one uncovered in Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and Industrial Control Systems (ICS). Upon those systems, the success criteria for security are quite dynamic. Security flaws in these automated SCADA systems have already been discovered by infiltrating the entire network in addition to reducing production line hazards. The objective of our review article is to show various potential future research voids that recent studies have, as well as how many methods are available to concentrate on specific aspects of risk assessment of manufactured systems. The state-of-the-art methods in cyber security risk assessment of SCADA systems are reviewed and compared in this research. Multiple contemporary risk assessment approaches developed for or deployed in the settings of a SCADA system are considered and examined in detail. We outline the approaches’ main points before analyzing them in terms of risk assessment, conventional analytical procedures, and research challenges. The paper also examines possible risk regions or locations where breaches in such automated SCADA systems can emerge, as well as solutions as to how to safeguard and eliminate the hazards when they arise during production manufacturing.
Gao, Xueqin, Shang, Tao, Li, Da, Liu, Jianwei.
2022.
Quantitative Risk Assessment of Threats on SCADA Systems Using Attack Countermeasure Tree. 2022 19th Annual International Conference on Privacy, Security & Trust (PST). :1–5.
SCADA systems are one of the critical infrastructures and face many security threats. Attackers can control SCADA systems through network attacks, destroying the normal operation of the power system. It is important to conduct a risk assessment of security threats on SCADA systems. However, existing models for risk assessment using attack trees mainly focus on describing possible intrusions rather than the interaction between threats and defenses. In this paper, we comprehensively consider intrusion likelihood and defense capability and propose a quantitative risk assessment model of security threats based on attack countermeasure tree (ACT). Each leaf node in ACT contains two attributes: exploitable vulnerabilities and defense countermeasures. An attack scenario can be constructed by means of traversing the leaf nodes. We set up six indicators to evaluate the impact of security threats in attack scenarios according to NISTIR 7628 standard. Experimental results show the attack probability of security threats and high-risk attack scenarios in SCADA systems. We can improve defense countermeasures to protect against security threats corresponding to high-risk scenarios. In addition, the model can continually update risk assessments based on the implementation of the system’s defensive countermeasures.
Frauenschläger, Tobias, Mottok, Jürgen.
2022.
Security-Gateway for SCADA-Systems in Critical Infrastructures. 2022 International Conference on Applied Electronics (AE). :1–6.
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are used to control and monitor components within the energy grid, playing a significant role in the stability of the system. As a part of critical infrastructures, components in these systems have to fulfill a variety of different requirements regarding their dependability and must also undergo strict audit procedures in order to comply with all relevant standards. This results in a slow adoption of new functionalities. Due to the emerged threat of cyberattacks against critical infrastructures, extensive security measures are needed within these systems to protect them from adversaries and ensure a stable operation. In this work, a solution is proposed to integrate extensive security measures into current systems. By deploying additional security-gateways into the communication path between two nodes, security features can be integrated transparently for the existing components. The developed security-gateway is compliant to all regulatory requirements and features an internal architecture based on the separation-of-concerns principle to increase its security and longevity. The viability of the proposed solution has been verified in different scenarios, consisting of realistic field tests, security penetration tests and various performance evaluations.
ISSN: 1805-9597
Cheng, Benny N..
2022.
Cybersecurity Modelling for SCADA Systems: A Case Study. 2022 Annual Reliability and Maintainability Symposium (RAMS). :1–4.
This paper describes a cybersecurity model for Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition system (SCADA) using techniques similar to those used in reliability systems modelling. Previously, cybersecurity events were considered a part of the reliability events of a cyber physical system [1] [2]. Our approach identifies and treats such events separately as unique class of events by itself. Our analyses shows that the hierarchical model described below has the potential for quantifying the cybersecurity posture of a SCADA system, which goes beyond the usual pass/fail metrics that are currently in use [3]. A range of Mean Time to Security Failure (MTTSF) values as shown in the sensitivity studies below can capture both peacetime and wartime cyber risk assessment of the system. While the Attack and Countermeasure Tree (ACT) constructed below could be taken as somewhat simplistic, more detailed security events can be readily introduced to the ACT tree to reflect a better depiction of a cyberattack. For example, the Common Processing Systems (CPS) systems themselves can be further resolved into constituent components that are vulnerable to cyberattacks. Separate models can also be developed for each of the individual failure events, i.e. confidentiality, integrity, and availability, instead of combining them into one failure event as done below. The methodology for computing the MTTSF metric can be extended to other similar cybersecurity metrics, such as those formulated by the Center for Internet Security (CIS) [3], e.g. mean time to restore to operational status, etc. Additional improvements to the model can be obtained with the incorporation of the repair and restore portion of the semi-Markov chain in Figure 3, which will likely require the use of more advance modeling packages.
ISSN: 2577-0993