Soliman, H. M..
2020.
An Optimization Approach to Graph Partitioning for Detecting Persistent Attacks in Enterprise Networks. 2020 International Symposium on Networks, Computers and Communications (ISNCC). :1—6.
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) refer to sophisticated, prolonged and multi-step attacks, planned and executed by skilled adversaries targeting government and enterprise networks. Attack graphs' topologies can be leveraged to detect, explain and visualize the progress of such attacks. However, due to the abundance of false-positives, such graphs are usually overwhelmingly large and difficult for an analyst to understand. Graph partitioning refers to the problem of reducing the graph of alerts to a set of smaller incidents that are easier for an analyst to process and better represent the actual attack plan. Existing approaches are oblivious to the security-context of the problem at hand and result in graphs which, while smaller, make little sense from a security perspective. In this paper, we propose an optimization approach allowing us to generate security-aware partitions, utilizing aspects such as the kill chain progression, number of assets involved, as well as the size of the graph. Using real-world datasets, the results show that our approach produces graphs that are better at capturing the underlying attack compared to state-of-the-art approaches and are easier for the analyst to understand.
Fu, T., Zhen, W., Qian, X. Z..
2020.
A Study of Evaluation Methods of WEB Security Threats Based on Multi-stage Attack. 2020 IEEE International Conference on Information Technology,Big Data and Artificial Intelligence (ICIBA). 1:1457—1461.
Web application services have gradually become an important support of Internet services, but are also facing increasingly serious security problems. It is extremely necessary to evaluate the security of Web application services to deal with attacks against them effectively. In this paper, in view of the characteristics of the current attack of Web application services, a Web security analysis model based on the kill chain is established, and the possible attacks against Web application services are analyzed in depth from the perspective of the kill chain. Then, the security of Web application services is evaluated in a quantitative manner. In this way, it can make up the defects of insufficient inspection by the existing security vulnerability model and the security specification of the tracking of Web application services, so as to realize the objective and scientific evaluation of the security state of Web application services.
Bajpai, P., Enbody, R..
2020.
Attacking Key Management in Ransomware. IT Professional. 22:21—27.
Ransomware have observed a steady growth over the years with several concerning trends that indicate efficient, targeted attacks against organizations and individuals alike. These opportunistic attackers indiscriminately target both public and private sector entities to maximize gain. In this article, we highlight the criticality of key management in ransomware's cryptosystem in order to facilitate building effective solutions against this threat. We introduce the ransomware kill chain to elucidate the path our adversaries must take to attain their malicious objective. We examine current solutions presented against ransomware in light of this kill chain and specify which constraints on ransomware are being violated by the existing solutions. Finally, we present the notion of memory attacks against ransomware's key management and present our initial experiments with dynamically extracting decryption keys from real-world ransomware. Results of our preliminary research are promising and the extracted keys were successfully deployed in subsequent data decryption.
Lee, Y., Woo, S., Song, Y., Lee, J., Lee, D. H..
2020.
Practical Vulnerability-Information-Sharing Architecture for Automotive Security-Risk Analysis. IEEE Access. 8:120009—120018.
Emerging trends that are shaping the future of the automotive industry include electrification, autonomous driving, sharing, and connectivity, and these trends keep changing annually. Thus, the automotive industry is shifting from mechanical devices to electronic control devices, and is not moving to Internet of Things devices connected to 5G networks. Owing to the convergence of automobile-information and communication technology (ICT), the safety and convenience features of automobiles have improved significantly. However, cyberattacks that occur in the existing ICT environment and can occur in the upcoming 5G network are being replicated in the automobile environment. In a hyper-connected society where 5G networks are commercially available, automotive security is extremely important, as vehicles become the center of vehicle to everything (V2X) communication connected to everything around them. Designing, developing, and deploying information security techniques for vehicles require a systematic security-risk-assessment and management process throughout the vehicle's lifecycle. To do this, a security risk analysis (SRA) must be performed, which requires an analysis of cyber threats on automotive vehicles. In this study, we introduce a cyber kill chain-based cyberattack analysis method to create a formal vulnerability-analysis system. We can also analyze car-hacking studies that were conducted on real cars to identify the characteristics of the attack stages of existing car-hacking techniques and propose the minimum but essential measures for defense. Finally, we propose an automotive common-vulnerabilities-and-exposure system to manage and share evolving vehicle-related cyberattacks, threats, and vulnerabilities.
Huo, T., Wang, W., Zhao, P., Li, Y., Wang, T., Li, M..
2020.
TEADS: A Defense-Aware Framework for Synthesizing Transient Execution Attacks. 2020 IEEE 19th International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom). :320—327.
Since 2018, a broad class of microarchitectural attacks called transient execution attacks (e.g., Spectre and Meltdown) have been disclosed. By abusing speculative execution mechanisms in modern CPUs, these attacks enable adversaries to leak secrets across security boundaries. A transient execution attack typically evolves through multiple stages, termed the attack chain. We find that current transient execution attacks usually rely on static attack chains, resulting in that any blockage in an attack chain may cause the failure of the entire attack. In this paper, we propose a novel defense-aware framework, called TEADS, for synthesizing transient execution attacks dynamically. The main idea of TEADS is that: each attacking stage in a transient execution attack chain can be implemented in several ways, and the implementations used in different attacking stages can be combined together under certain constraints. By constructing an attacking graph representing combination relationships between the implementations and testing available paths in the attacking graph dynamically, we can finally synthesize transient execution attacks which can bypass the imposed defense techniques. Our contributions include: (1) proposing an automated defense-aware framework for synthesizing transient execution attacks, even though possible combinations of defense strategies are enabled; (2) presenting an attacking graph extension algorithm to detect potential attack chains dynamically; (3) implementing TEADS and testing it on several modern CPUs with different protection settings. Experimental results show that TEADS can bypass the defenses equipped, improving the adaptability and durability of transient execution attacks.