| Title | Implementation of Cache Timing Attack Based on Present Algorithm |
| Publication Type | Conference Paper |
| Year of Publication | 2022 |
| Authors | Lin, Chen, Wang, Yi |
| Conference Name | 2022 8th Annual International Conference on Network and Information Systems for Computers (ICNISC) |
| Date Published | sep |
| Keywords | cache timing attack, Central Processing Unit, Chained Attacks, Ciphers, Costs, Encryption, Hardware, PRESENT algorithm, pubcrawl, resilience, Resiliency, Scalability, side channel trojan, side-channel attacks, Timing |
| Abstract | Traditional side-channel attacks have shortcomings such as low efficiency, extremely difficult collection and injection of fault information in real environments, and poor applicability of attacks. The cache timing attack proposed in recent years is a new type of side-channel attack method. This attack method uses the difference in the reading speed of the computer CPU cache to enable the attacker to obtain the confidential information during the execution of the algorithm. The attack efficiency is high, and the cost is relatively low. little. Present algorithm is a lightweight block cipher proposed in 2007. The algorithm has excellent hardware implementation and concise round function design. On this basis, scholars at home and abroad have carried out different side-channel attacks on it, such as differential attacks., multiple differential chain attacks, algebraic attacks, etc. At present, there is no published research on the Cache timing attack against the Present algorithm at home and abroad. In this paper, the output value of the S box in the first and second rounds of the encryption process is obtained through the combination of the Cache timing attack and the side-channel Trojan horse, and Combined with the key recovery algorithm, the master key of the algorithm is finally recovered. |
| DOI | 10.1109/ICNISC57059.2022.00016 |
| Citation Key | lin_implementation_2022 |
Implementation of Cache Timing Attack Based on Present Algorithm