Biblio
In the last decade, numerous Industrial IoT systems have been deployed. Attack vectors and security solutions for these are an active area of research. However, to the best of our knowledge, only very limited insight in the applicability and real-world comparability of attacks exists. To overcome this widespread problem, we have developed and realized an approach to collect attack traces at a larger scale. An easily deployable system integrates well into existing networks and enables the investigation of attacks on unmodified commercial devices.
Low-Power and Lossy Networks (LLNs) run on resource-constrained devices and play a key role in many Industrial Internet of Things and Cyber-Physical Systems based applications. But, achieving an energy-efficient routing in LLNs is a major challenge nowadays. This challenge is addressed by Routing Protocol for Low-power Lossy Networks (RPL), which is specified in RFC 6550 as a “Proposed Standard” at present. In RPL, a client node uses Destination Advertisement Object (DAO) control messages to pass on the destination information towards the root node. An attacker may exploit the DAO sending mechanism of RPL to perform a DAO Insider attack in LLNs. In this paper, it is shown that an aggressive attacker can drastically degrade the network performance. To address DAO Insider attack, a lightweight defense solution is proposed. The proposed solution uses an early blacklisting strategy to significantly mitigate the attack and restore RPL performance. The proposed solution is implemented and tested on Cooja Simulator.
Industrial IoT (IIoT) is a specialized subset of IoT which involves the interconnection of industrial devices with ubiquitous control and intelligent processing services to improve industrial system's productivity and operational capability. In essence, IIoT adapts a use-case specific architecture based on RFID sense network, BLE sense network or WSN, where heterogeneous industrial IoT devices can collaborate with each other to achieve a common goal. Nonetheless, most of the IIoT deployments are brownfield in nature which involves both new and legacy technologies (SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition System)). The merger of these technologies causes high degree of cross-linking and decentralization which ultimately increases the complexity of IIoT systems and introduce new vulnerabilities. Hence, industrial organizations becomes not only vulnerable to conventional SCADA attacks but also to a multitude of IIoT specific threats. However, there is a lack of understanding of these attacks both with respect to the literature and empirical evaluation. As a consequence, it is infeasible for industrial organizations, researchers and developers to analyze attacks and derive a robust security mechanism for IIoT. In this paper, we developed a multi-layer taxonomy of IIoT attacks by considering both brownfield and greenfield architecture of IIoT. The taxonomy consists of 11 layers 94 dimensions and approximately 100 attack techniques which helps to provide a holistic overview of the incident attack pattern, attack characteristics and impact on industrial system. Subsequently, we have exhibited the practical relevance of developed taxonomy by applying it to a real-world use-case. This research will benefit researchers and developers to best utilize developed taxonomy for analyzing attack sequence and to envisage an efficient security platform for futuristic IIoT applications.
The upsurge of Industrial Internet of Things is forcing industrial information systems to enable less hierarchical information flow. The connections between humans, devices, and their digital twins are growing in numbers, creating a need for new kind of security and trust solutions. To address these needs, industries are applying distributed ledger technologies, aka blockchains. A significant number of use cases have been studied in the sectors of logistics, energy markets, smart grid security, and food safety, with frequently reported benefits in transparency, reduced costs, and disintermediation. However, distributed ledger technologies have challenges with transaction throughput, latency, and resource requirements, which render the technology unusable in many cases, particularly with constrained Internet of Things devices.To overcome these challenges within the Industrial Internet of Things, we suggest a set of interledger approaches that enable trusted information exchange across different ledgers and constrained devices. With these approaches, the technically most suitable ledger technology can be selected for each use case while simultaneously enjoying the benefits of the most widespread ledger implementations. We present state of the art for distributed ledger technologies to support the use of interledger approaches in industrial settings.
Industrial Control systems traditionally achieved security by using proprietary protocols to communicate in an isolated environment from the outside. This paradigm is changed with the advent of the Industrial Internet of Things that foresees flexible and interconnected systems. In this contribution, a device acting as a connection between the operational technology network and information technology network is proposed. The device is an intrusion detection system related to legacy systems that is able to collect and reporting data to and from industrial IoT devices. It is based on the common signature based intrusion detection system developed in the information technology domain, however, to cope with the constraints of the operation technology domain, it exploits anomaly based features. Specifically, it is able to analyze the traffic on the network at application layer by mean of deep packet inspection, parsing the information carried by the proprietary protocols. At a later stage, it collect and aggregate data from and to IoT domain. A simple set up is considered to prove the effectiveness of the approach.
The amount of connected devices in the industrial environment is growing continuously, due to the ongoing demands of new features like predictive maintenance. New business models require more data, collected by IIoT edge node sensors based on inexpensive and low performance Microcontroller Units (MCUs). A negative side effect of this rise of interconnections is the increased attack surface, enabled by a larger network with more network services. Attaching badly documented and cheap devices to industrial networks often without permission of the administrator even further increases the security risk. A decent method to monitor the network and detect “unwanted” devices is network scanning. Typically, this scanning procedure is executed by a computer or server in each sub-network. In this paper, we introduce network scanning and mapping as a building block to scan directly from the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) edge node devices. This module scans the network in a pseudo-random periodic manner to discover devices and detect changes in the network structure. Furthermore, we validate our approach in an industrial testbed to show the feasibility of this approach.
In industrial internet of things, various devices are connected to external internet. For the connected devices, the authentication is very important in the viewpoint of security; therefore, physical unclonable functions (PUFs) have attracted attention as authentication techniques. On the other hand, the risk of modeling attacks on PUFs, which clone the function of PUFs mathematically, is pointed out. Therefore, a resistant-PUF such as a lightweight PUF has been proposed. However, new analytical methods (side-channel attacks: SCAs), which use side-channel information such as power or electromagnetic waves, have been proposed. The countermeasure method has also been proposed; however, an evaluation using actual devices has not been studied. Since PUFs use small production variations, the implementation evaluation is very important. Therefore, this study proposes a SCA countermeasure of the lightweight PUF. The proposed method is based on the previous studies, and maintains power consumption consistency during the generation of response. In experiments using a field programmable gate array, the measured power consumption was constant regardless of output values of the PUF could be confirmed. Then, experimental results showed that the predicted rate of the response was about 50 %, and the proposed method had a tamper resistance against SCAs.
The server is an important for storing data, collected during the diagnostics of Smart Business Center (SBC) as a subsystem of Industrial Internet of Things including sensors, network equipment, components for start and storage of monitoring programs and technical diagnostics. The server is exposed most often to various kind of attacks, in particular, aimed at processor, interface system, random access memory. The goal of the paper is analyzing the methods of the SBC server protection from malicious actions, as well as the development and investigation of the Markov model of the server's functioning in the SBC network, taking into account the impact of DDoS-attacks.
Today's emerging Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) scenarios are characterized by the exchange of data between services across enterprises. Traditional access and usage control mechanisms are only able to determine if data may be used by a subject, but lack an understanding of how it may be used. The ability to control the way how data is processed is however crucial for enterprises to guarantee (and provide evidence of) compliant processing of critical data, as well as for users who need to control if their private data may be analyzed or linked with additional information - a major concern in IoT applications processing personal information. In this paper, we introduce LUCON, a data-centric security policy framework for distributed systems that considers data flows by controlling how messages may be routed across services and how they are combined and processed. LUCON policies prevent information leaks, bind data usage to obligations, and enforce data flows across services. Policy enforcement is based on a dynamic taint analysis at runtime and an upfront static verification of message routes against policies. We discuss the semantics of these two complementing enforcement models and illustrate how LUCON policies are compiled from a simple policy language into a first-order logic representation. We demonstrate the practical application of LUCON in a real-world IoT middleware and discuss its integration into Apache Camel. Finally, we evaluate the runtime impact of LUCON and discuss performance and scalability aspects.
All over the world, objects are increasingly connected in networks such as the Industrial Internet of Things. Interconnections, intercommunications and interactions are driving the development of an entirely new whole in the form of the Industrial Internet of Things. Communication and interaction are the norm both for separate components, such as cyber-physical systems, and for the functioning of the system as a whole. This new whole can be likened to a natural ecosystem where the process of homeostasis ensures the stability and security of the whole. Components of such an industrial ecosystem, or even an industrial ecosystem as a whole, are increasingly targeted by cyber attacks. Such attacks not only threaten the functioning of one or multiple components, they also constitute a threat to the functioning of the new whole. General systems theory can offer a scientific framework for the development of measures to improve the security and stability of both separate components and the new whole.