Biblio

This project enhances the security in which Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol for MANETs with the game theoretical approach. This is achieved by using public key and private key for encryption and decryption processes. Proactive and reactive method is implemented in the proposed system. Reactive method is done in identification process but in proactive method is used to identify the nodes and also block the hackers node, then change the direction of data transmission to good nodes. This application can be used in military, research, confidential and emergency circumferences.

Mobile Ad-hoc Networks are dynamic in nature and do not have fixed infrastructure to govern nodes in the networks. The mission lies ahead in coordinating among such dynamically shifting nodes. The root problem of identifying and isolating misbehaving nodes that refuse to forward packets in multi-hop ad hoc networks is solved by the development of a comprehensive system called Audit-based Misbehavior Detection (AMD) that can efficiently isolates selective and continuous packet droppers. AMD evaluates node behavior on a per-packet basis, without using energy-expensive overhearing techniques or intensive acknowledgment schemes. Moreover, AMD can detect selective dropping attacks even in end-to-end encrypted traffic and can be applied to multi-channel networks. Game theoretical approaches are more suitable in deciding upon the reward mechanisms for which the mobile nodes operate upon. Rewards or penalties have to be decided by ensuring a clean and healthy MANET environment. A non-routine yet surprise alterations are well required in place in deciding suitable and safe reward strategies. This work focuses on integrating a Audit-based Misbehaviour Detection (AMD)scheme and an incentive based reputation scheme with game theoretical approach called Supervisory Game to analyze the selfish behavior of nodes in the MANETs environment. The proposed work GAMD significantly reduces the cost of detecting misbehavior nodes in the network.

In this paper, a game-theoretical solution concept is utilized to tackle the collusion attack in a SDN-based framework. In our proposed setting, the defenders (i.e., switches) are incentivized not to collude with the attackers in a repeated-game setting that utilizes a reputation system. We first illustrate our model and its components. We then use a socio-rational approach to provide a new anti-collusion solution that shows cooperation with the SDN controller is always Nash Equilibrium due to the existence of a long-term utility function in our model.