Biblio

Key Management in Delay Tolerant Networks (DTN) still remains an unsolved complex problem. Due to peculiar characteristics of DTN, important challenges that make it difficult to design key management architecture are: 1) no systematic requirement analysis is undertaken to define its components, their composition and prescribed functions; and 2) no framework is available for its seamless integration with Bundle Security Protocol (BSP). This paper proposes a Key Management Architecture for DTN (KMAD) to address challenges in DTN key management. The proposed architecture not only provides guidelines for key management in DTN but also caters for seamless integration with BSP. The framework utilizes public key cryptography to provide required security services to enable exchange of keying material, and information about security policy and cipher suites. The framework also supports secure exchange of control and data information in DTNs.

The internet of things (IoT) is consisting of many complementary elements which have their own specificities and capacities. These elements are gaining new application and use cases in our lives. Nevertheless, they open a negative horizon of security and privacy issues which must be treated delicately before the deployment of any IoT. Recently, different works emerged dealing with the same branch of issues, like the work of Yuwen Chen et al. that is called LightPriAuth. LightPriAuth has several drawbacks and weakness against various popular attacks such as Insider attack and stolen smart card. Our objective in this paper is to propose a novel solution which is “authentication scheme with three factor using ECC and fuzzy extractor” to ensure security and privacy. The obtained results had proven the superiority of our scheme's performances compared to that of LightPriAuth which, additionally, had defeated the weaknesses left by LightPriAuth.

In this paper, we address the fundamental problem of securely bootstrapping a group of wireless devices to a hub, when none of the devices share prior associations (secrets) with the hub or between them. This scenario aligns with the secure deployment of body area networks, IoT, medical devices, industrial automation sensors, autonomous vehicles, and others. We develop VERSE, a physical-layer group message integrity verification primitive that effectively detects advanced wireless signal manipulations that can be used to launch man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks over wireless. Without using shared secrets to establish authenticated channels, such attacks are notoriously difficult to thwart and can undermine the authentication and key establishment processes. VERSE exploits the existence of multiple devices to verify the integrity of the messages exchanged within the group. We then use VERSE to build a bootstrapping protocol, which securely introduces new devices to the network. Compared to the state-of-the-art, VERSE achieves in-band message integrity verification during secure pairing using only the RF modality without relying on out-of-band channels or extensive human involvement. It guarantees security even when the adversary is capable of fully controlling the wireless channel by annihilating and injecting wireless signals. We study the limits of such advanced wireless attacks and prove that the introduction of multiple legitimate devices can be leveraged to increase the security of the pairing process. We validate our claims via theoretical analysis and extensive experimentations on the USRP platform. We further discuss various implementation aspects such as the effect of time synchronization between devices and the effects of multipath and interference. Note that the elimination of shared secrets, default passwords, and public key infrastructures effectively addresses the related key management challenges when these are considered at scale.

Wireless communications in Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are vulnerable to many adversarial attacks such as eavesdropping. To secure the communications, secret session keys need to be established between wireless devices. In existing symmetric key establishment protocols, it is assumed that devices are pre-loaded with secrets. In the CPS, however, wireless devices are produced by different companies. It is not practical to assume that the devices are pre-loaded with certain secrets when they leave companies. As a consequence, existing symmetric key establishment protocols cannot be directly implemented in the CPS. Motivated by these observations, this paper presents a cross-layer key establishment model for heterogeneous wireless devices in the CPS. Specifically, by implementing our model, wireless devices extract master keys (shared with the system authority) at the physical layer using ambient wireless signals. Then, the system authority distributes secrets for devices (according to an existing symmetric key establishment protocol) by making use of the extracted master keys. Completing these operations, wireless devices can establish secret session keys at higher layers by calling the employed key establishment protocol. Additionally, we prove the security of the proposed model. We analyse the performance of the new model by implementing it and converting existing symmetric key establishment protocols into cross-layer key establishment protocols.