Biblio

Present-day vehicles have numerous Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and they communicate with each other over a network known as the Controller Area Network(CAN) bus. In this way, the CAN bus is a fundamental component of intra-vehicle communication. The CAN bus was designed without focusing on communication security and in this way it is vulnerable to many cyber attacks. As the vehicles are always connected to the Internet, the CAN bus is remotely accessible and could be hacked. To secure the communication between ECUs and defend against these cyber attacks, we apply a Hash Message Authentication Code(HMAC) to automotive data and demonstrate the CAN bus communication between two ECUs using Arduino UNO and MCP2515 CAN bus module.

Controller Area Network is the most widely adopted communication standard in automobiles. The CAN protocol is robust and is designed to minimize overhead. The light-weight nature of this protocol implies that it can't efficiently process secure communication. With the exponential increase in automobile communications, there is an urgent need for efficient and effective security countermeasures. We propose a support vector machine based intrusion detection system that is able to detect anomalous behavior with high accuracy. We outline a process for parameter selection and feature vector selection. We identify strengths and weaknesses of our system and propose to extend our work for time-series based data.

While vehicle to everything (V2X) communication enables safety-critical automotive control systems to better support various connected services to improve safety and convenience of drivers, they also allow automotive attack surfaces to increase dynamically in modern vehicles. Many researchers as well as hackers have already demonstrated that they can take remote control of the targeted car by exploiting the vulnerabilities of in-vehicle networks such as Controller Area Networks (CANs). For assuring CAN security, we focus on how to authenticate electronic control units (ECUs) in real-time by addressing the security challenges of in-vehicle networks. In this paper, we propose a novel and lightweight authentication protocol with an attack-resilient tree algorithm, which is based on one-way hash chain. The protocol can be easily deployed in CAN by performing a firmware update of ECU. We have shown analytically that the protocol achieves a high level of security. In addition, the performance of the proposed protocol is validated on CANoe simulator for virtual ECUs and Freescale S12XF used in real vehicles. The results show that our protocol is more efficient than other authentication protocol in terms of authentication time, response time, and service delay.

Modern vehicles may contain a considerable number of ECUs (Electronic Control Units) which are connected through various means of communication, with the CAN (Controller Area Network) protocol being the most widely used. However, several vulnerabilities such as the lack of authentication and the lack of data encryption have been pointed out by several authors, which ultimately render vehicles unsafe to their users and surroundings. Moreover, the lack of security in modern automobiles has been studied and analyzed by other researchers as well as several reports about modern car hacking have (already) been published. The contribution of this work aimed to analyze and test the level of security and how resilient is the CAN protocol by taking a BMW E90 (3-series) instrument cluster as a sample for a proof of concept study. This investigation was carried out by building and developing a rogue device using cheap commercially available components while being connected to the same CAN-Bus as a man in the middle device in order to send spoofed messages to the instrument cluster.

In-vehicle networks like Controller Area Network, FlexRay, Ethernet are now subjected to huge security threats where unauthorized entities can take control of the whole vehicle. This can pose very serious threats including accidents. Security features like encryption, message authentication are getting implemented in vehicle networks to counteract these issues. This paper is proposing a set of novel validation techniques to ensure that vehicle network security is fool proof. Security validation against requirements, security validation using white box approach, black box approach and grey box approaches are put forward. Test system architecture, validation of message authentication, decoding the patterns from vehicle network data, using diagnostics as a security loophole, V2V V2X loopholes, gateway module security testing are considered in detail. Aim of this research paper is to put forward a set of tools and methods for finding and reporting any security loopholes in the in-vehicle network security implementation.