Biblio

With the development of industrial informatization, information security in the power production industry is becoming more and more important. In the power production industry, as the critical information egress of the industrial control system, the information security of the Networked Control System is particularly important. This paper proposes a construction method for an information security platform of Networked Control System, which is used for research, testing and training of Networked Control System information security.

The implication of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) in critical infrastructures (e.g., smart grids, water distribution networks, etc.) has introduced new security issues and vulnerabilities to those systems. In this paper, we demonstrate that black-box system identification using Support Vector Regression (SVR) can be used efficiently to build a model of a given industrial system even when this system is protected with a watermark-based detector. First, we briefly describe the Tennessee Eastman Process used in this study. Then, we present the principal of detection scheme and the theory behind SVR. Finally, we design an efficient black-box SVR algorithm for the Tennessee Eastman Process. Extensive simulations prove the efficiency of our proposed algorithm.

Advances on the integration of wireless sensor and actuator networks, as a whole, have contribute to the greater reconfigurability of systems and lower installation costs with application to supervision of networked control systems. This integration, however, increases some vulnerabilities associated with the physical world and also with the cyber and security world. This trend makes the wireless nodes one of the most vulnerable component of these kind of systems, which can have a major impact on the overall performance of the networked control system. This paper presents an architecture relying on a hierarchical multi-agent system for resilience enhancement, with focus on wireless sensor and actuator networks. The proposed framework was evaluated on an IPv6 test-bed comprising several distributed devices, where performance and communication links health are analyzed. The relevance of the proposed approach is demonstrated by results collected from the test-bed.

This paper studies the sensor placement problem in a networked control system for improving its security against cyber-physical attacks. The problem is formulated as a zero-sum game between an attacker and a detector. The attacker's decision is to select f nodes of the network to attack whereas the detector's decision is to place f sensors to detect the presence of the attack signals. In our formulation, the attacker minimizes its visibility, defined as the system L2 gain from the attack signals to the deployed sensors' outputs, and the detector maximizes the visibility of the attack signals. The equilibrium strategy of the game determines the optimal locations of the sensors. The existence of Nash equilibrium for the attacker-detector game is studied when the underlying connectivity graph is a directed or an undirected tree. When the game does not admit a Nash equilibrium, it is shown that the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game, with the detector as the game leader, can be computed efficiently. Our results show that, under the optimal sensor placement strategy, an undirected topology provides a higher security level for a networked control system compared with its corresponding directed topology.

In this paper, security of networked control system (NCS) under denial of service (DoS) attack is considered. Different from the existing literatures from the perspective of control systems, this paper considers a novel method of dynamic allocation of network bandwidth for NCS under DoS attack. Firstly, time-constrained DoS attack and its impact on the communication channel of NCS are introduced. Secondly, details for the proposed dynamic bandwidth allocation structure are presented along with an implementation, which is a bandwidth allocation strategy based on error between current state and equilibrium state and available bandwidth. Finally, a numerical example is given to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed bandwidth allocation approach.

Networked Control Systems (NCS) are widely used in Industry 4.0 to obtain better management and operational capabilities, as well as to reduce costs. However, despite the benefits provided by NCSs, the integration of communication networks with physical plants can also expose these systems to cyber threats. This work proposes a link monitoring strategy to identify linear time-invariant transfer functions performed by a Man-in-the-Middle during controlled data injection attacks in NCSs. The results demonstrate that the proposed identification scheme provides adequate accuracy when estimating the attack function, and does not interfere in the plant behavior when the system is not under attack.

In the present paper, the problem of networked control system (NCS) cyber security is considered. The geometric approach is used to evaluate the security and vulnerability level of the controlled system. The proposed results are about the so-called false data injection attacks and show how imperfectly known disturbances can be used to perform undetectable, or at least stealthy, attacks that can make the NCS vulnerable to attacks from malicious outsiders. A numerical example is given to illustrate the approach.

The importance of Networked Control Systems (NCS) is steadily increasing due to recent trends such as smart factories. Correct functionality of such NCS needs to be protected as malfunctioning systems could have severe consequences for the controlled process or even threaten human lives. However, with the increase in NCS, also attacks targeting these systems are becoming more frequent. To mitigate attacks that utilize captured sensor data in an NCS, transferred data needs to be protected. While using well-known methods such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) might be suitable to protect the data, resource constraint devices such as sensors often are not powerful enough to perform the necessary cryptographic operations. Also, as we will show in this paper, applying simple encryption in an NCS may enable easy Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks by attacking single bits of the encrypted data. Therefore, in this paper, we present a hardware-based approach that enables sensors to perform the necessary encryption while being robust against (injected) bit failures.

In this paper, the mathematical framework of behavioral system will be applied to detect the cyber-attack on the networked control system which is used to control the remotely operated underwater vehicle ROV. The Intelligent Generalized Predictive Controller IGPC is used to control the ROV. The IGPC is designed with fault-tolerant ability. In consequence of the used fault accommodation technique, the proposed cyber-attacks detector is able to clearly detect the presence of attacker control signal and to distinguish between the effects of the attacker signal and fault on the plant side. The test result of the suggested method demonstrates that it can be considerably used for detection of the cyber-attack.

In this paper, cyber physical system is analyzed from security perspective. A double closed-loop security control structure and algorithm with defense functions is proposed. From this structure, the features of several cyber attacks are considered respectively. By this structure, the models of information disclosure, denial-of-service (DoS) and Man-in-the-Middle Attack (MITM) are proposed. According to each kind attack, different models are obtained and analyzed, then reduce to the unified models. Based on this, system security conditions are obtained, and a defense scenario with detail algorithm is design to illustrate the implementation of this program.