Biblio
We present an online framework for learning and updating security policies in dynamic IT environments. It includes three components: a digital twin of the target system, which continuously collects data and evaluates learned policies; a system identification process, which periodically estimates system models based on the collected data; and a policy learning process that is based on reinforcement learning. To evaluate our framework, we apply it to an intrusion prevention use case that involves a dynamic IT infrastructure. Our results demonstrate that the framework automatically adapts security policies to changes in the IT infrastructure and that it outperforms a state-of-the-art method.
A Robot Operating System (ROS) plays a significant role in organizing industrial robots for manufacturing. With an increasing number of the robots, the operators integrate a ROS with networked communication to share the data. This cyber-physical nature exposes the ROS to cyber attacks. To this end, this paper proposes a cross-layer approach to achieve secure and resilient control of a ROS. In the physical layer, due to the delay caused by the security mechanism, we design a time-delay controller for the ROS agent. In the cyber layer, we define cyber states and use Markov Decision Process to evaluate the tradeoffs between physical and security performance. Due to the uncertainty of the cyber state, we extend the MDP to a Partially Observed Markov Decision Process (POMDP). We propose a threshold solution based on our theoretical results. Finally, we present numerical examples to evaluate the performance of the secure and resilient mechanism.
Emerging zero-day vulnerabilities in information and communications technology systems make cyber defenses very challenging. In particular, the defender faces uncertainties of; e.g., system states and the locations and the impacts of vulnerabilities. In this paper, we study the defense problem on a computer network that is modeled as a partially observable Markov decision process on a Bayesian attack graph. We propose online algorithms which allow the defender to identify effective defense policies when utility functions are unknown a priori. The algorithm performance is verified via numerical simulations based on real-world attacks.