Biblio

Multiple techniques for modeling cybersecurity attacks and defense have been developed. The use of tree- structures as well as techniques proposed by several firms (such as Lockheed Martin's Cyber Kill Chain, Microsoft's STRIDE and the MITRE ATT&CK frameworks) have all been demonstrated. These approaches model actions that can be taken to attack or stopped to secure infrastructure and other resources, at different levels of detail.This paper builds on prior work on using the Blackboard Architecture for cyberwarfare and proposes a generalized solution for modeling framework/paradigm-based attacks that go beyond the deployment of a single exploit against a single identified target. The Blackboard Architecture Cyber Command Entity attack Route (BACCER) identification system combines rules and facts that implement attack type determination and attack decision making logic with actions that implement reconnaissance techniques and attack and defense actions. BACCER's efficacy to model examples of tree-structures and other models is demonstrated herein.

Computational trust is the digital counterpart of the human notion of trust as applied in social systems. Its main purpose is to improve the reliability of interactions in online communities and of knowledge transfer in information management systems. Trust models are formal frameworks in which the notion of computational trust is described rigorously and where its dynamics are explained precisely. In this paper we will consider and extend a computational trust model, i.e., JØsang's Subjective Logic: we will show how this model is well-suited to describe the dynamics of computational trust, but lacks effective tools to compute initial trust values to feed in the model. To overcome some of the issues with subjective logic, we will introduce a logical language which can be employed to describe and reason about trust. The core ideas behind the logical language will turn out to be useful in computing initial trust values to feed into subjective logic. The aim of the paper is, therefore, that of providing an improvement on subjective logic.

This paper deals with the comparison of the most popular methods of a logical analysis of natural language Montague intensional logic and Transparent intensional logic. At first, these logical apparatuses are compared in terms of their founding theoretical principles. Later, the selected sentence is examined through the logical analysis. The aim of the paper is to identify a more expressive logical method, which will be a suitable basis for the future design of an algorithm for the automated translation of the natural language into a formal representation of its meaning through a semantic machine.

To improve production efficiency, more industrial control systems are connected to IT networks, and more IT technologies are applied to industrial control networks, network security has become an important problem. Industrial control network security analysis and decision-making is a effective method to solve the problem, which can predict risks and support to make decisions before the actual fault of the industrial control network system has not occurred. This paper proposes a security analysis and decision-making method with forward reasoning based on strong relevant logic for industrial control networks. The paper presents a case study in security analysis and decision-making for industrial control networks. The result of the case study shows that the proposed method is effective.

Formal verification of infinite-state systems, and distributed systems in particular, is a long standing research goal. In the deductive verification approach, the programmer provides inductive invariants and pre/post specifications of procedures, reducing the verification problem to checking validity of logical verification conditions. This check is often performed by automated theorem provers and SMT solvers, substantially increasing productivity in the verification of complex systems. However, the unpredictability of automated provers presents a major hurdle to usability of these tools. This problem is particularly acute in case of provers that handle undecidable logics, for example, first-order logic with quantifiers and theories such as arithmetic. The resulting extreme sensitivity to minor changes has a strong negative impact on the convergence of the overall proof effort.

We consider the problem of verifying the security of finitely many sessions of a protocol that tosses coins in addition to standard cryptographic primitives against a Dolev-Yao adversary. Two properties are investigated here - secrecy, which asks if no adversary interacting with a protocol P can determine a secret sec with probability textgreater 1 - p; and indistinguishability, which asks if the probability observing any sequence 0$øverline$ in P1 is the same as that of observing 0$øverline$ in P2, under the same adversary. Both secrecy and indistinguishability are known to be coNP-complete for non-randomized protocols. In contrast, we show that, for randomized protocols, secrecy and indistinguishability are both decidable in coNEXPTIME. We also prove a matching lower bound for the secrecy problem by reducing the non-satisfiability problem of monadic first order logic without equality.