Biblio
Accurate and synchronized timing information is required by power system operators for controlling the grid infrastructure (relays, Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs), etc.) and determining asset positions. Satellite-based global positioning system (GPS) is the primary source of timing information. However, GPS disruptions today (both intentional and unintentional) can significantly compromise the reliability and security of our electric grids. A robust alternate source for accurate timing is critical to serve both as a deterrent against malicious attacks and as a redundant system in enhancing the resilience against extreme events that could disrupt the GPS network. To achieve this, we rely on the highly accurate, terrestrial atomic clock-based network for alternative timing and synchronization. In this paper, we discuss an experimental setup for an alternative timing approach. The data obtained from this experimental setup is continuously monitored and analyzed using various time deviation metrics. We also use these metrics to compute deviations of our clock with respect to the National Institute of Standards and Technologys (NIST) GPS data. The results obtained from these metric computations are elaborately discussed. Finally, we discuss the integration of the procedures involved, like real-time data ingestion, metric computation, and result visualization, in a novel microservices-based architecture for situational awareness.
The power grid is considered to be the most critical piece of infrastructure in the United States because each of the other fifteen critical infrastructures, as defined by the Cyberse-curity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), require the energy sector to properly function. Due the critical nature of the power grid, the ability to detect anomalies in the power grid is of critical importance to prevent power outages, avoid damage to sensitive equipment and to maintain a working power grid. Over the past few decades, the modern power grid has evolved into a large Cyber Physical System (CPS) equipped with wide area monitoring systems (WAMS) and distributed control. As smart technology advances, the power grid continues to be upgraded with high fidelity sensors and measurement devices, such as phasor measurement units (PMUs), that can report the state of the system with a high temporal resolution. However, this influx of data can often become overwhelming to the legacy Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system, as well as, the power system operator. In this paper, we propose using a deep learning (DL) convolutional neural network (CNN) as a module within the Automatic Network Guardian for ELectrical systems (ANGEL) Digital Twin environment to detect physical faults in a power system. The presented approach uses high fidelity measurement data from the IEEE 9-bus and IEEE 39-bus benchmark power systems to not only detect if there is a fault in the power system but also applies the algorithm to classify which bus contains the fault.
State estimation is the core operation performed within the energy management system (EMS) of smart grid. Hence, the reliability and integrity of a smart grid relies heavily on the performance of sensor measurement dependent state estimation process. The increasing penetration of cyber control into the smart grid operations has raised severe concern for executing a secured state estimation process. The limitation with regard to monitoring large number of sensors allows an intruder to manipulate sensor information, as one of the soft targets for disrupting power system operations. Phasor measurement unit (PMU) can be adopted as an alternative to immunize the state estimation from corrupted conventional sensor measurements. However, the high installation cost of PMUs restricts its installation throughout the network. In this paper a graphical approach is proposed to identify minimum PMU placement locations, so as to detect any intrusion of malicious activity within the smart grid. The high speed synchronized PMU information ensures processing of secured set of sensor measurements to the control center. The results of PMU information based linear state estimation is compared with the conventional non-linear state estimation to detect any attack within the system. The effectiveness of the proposed scheme has been validated on IEEE 14 bus test system.
In dynamic control centers, conventional SCADA systems are enhanced with novel assistance functionalities to increase existing monitoring and control capabilities. To achieve this, different key technologies like phasor measurement units (PMU) and Digital Twins (DT) are incorporated, which give rise to new cyber-security challenges. To address these issues, a four-stage threat analysis approach is presented to identify and assess system vulnerabilities for novel dynamic control center architectures. For this, a simplified risk assessment method is proposed, which allows a detailed analysis of the different system vulnerabilities considering various active and passive cyber-attack types. Qualitative results of the threat analysis are presented and discussed for different use cases at the control center and substation level.
Reliable and secure grid operations become more and more challenging in context of increasing IT/OT convergence and decreasing dynamic margins in today's power systems. To ensure the correct operation of monitoring and control functions in control centres, an intelligent assessment of the different information sources is necessary to provide a robust data source in case of critical physical events as well as cyber-attacks. Within this paper, a holistic data stream assessment methodology is proposed using an expert knowledge based cyber-physical situational awareness for different steady and transient system states. This approach goes beyond existing techniques by combining high-resolution PMU data with SCADA information as well as Digital Twin and AI based anomaly detection functionalities.
This paper presents a new micro-architectural vulnerability on the power management units of modern computers which creates an electromagnetic-based side-channel. The key observations that enable us to discover this sidechannel are: 1) in an effort to manage and minimize power consumption, modern microprocessors have a number of possible operating modes (power states) in which various sub-systems of the processor are powered down, 2) for some of the transitions between power states, the processor also changes the operating mode of the voltage regulator module (VRM) that supplies power to the affected sub-system, and 3) the electromagnetic (EM) emanations from the VRM are heavily dependent on its operating mode. As a result, these state-dependent EM emanations create a side-channel which can potentially reveal sensitive information about the current state of the processor and, more importantly, the programs currently being executed. To demonstrate the feasibility of exploiting this vulnerability, we create a covert channel by utilizing the changes in the processor's power states. We show how such a covert channel can be leveraged to exfiltrate sensitive information from a secured and completely isolated (air-gapped) laptop system by placing a compact, inexpensive receiver in proximity to that system. To further show the severity of this attack, we also demonstrate how such a covert channel can be established when the target and the receiver are several meters away from each other, including scenarios where the receiver and the target are separated by a wall. Compared to the state-of-the-art, the proposed covert channel has \textbackslashtextgreater3x higher bit-rate. Finally, to demonstrate that this new vulnerability is not limited to being used as a covert channel, we demonstrate how it can be used for attacks such as keystroke logging.
The chances of cyber-attacks have been increased because of incorporation of communication networks and information technology in power system. Main objective of the paper is to prove that attacker can launch the attack vector without the knowledge of complete network information and the injected false data can't be detected by power system operator. This paper also deals with analyzing the impact of multi-attacking strategy on the power system. This false data attacks incurs lot of damage to power system, as it misguides the power system operator. Here, we demonstrate the construction of attack vector and later we have demonstrated multiple attacking regions in IEEE 14 bus system. Impact of attack vector on the power system can be observed and it is proved that the attack cannot be detected by power system operator with the help of residue check method.