Biblio
Cloud forensics investigates the crime committed over cloud infrastructures like SLA-violations and storage privacy. Cloud storage forensics is the process of recording the history of the creation and operations performed on a cloud data object and investing it. Secure data provenance in the Cloud is crucial for data accountability, forensics, and privacy. Towards this, we present a Cloud-based data provenance framework using Blockchain, which traces data record operations and generates provenance data. Initially, we design a dropbox like application using AWS S3 storage. The application creates a cloud storage application for the students and faculty of the university, thereby making the storage and sharing of work and resources efficient. Later, we design a data provenance mechanism for confidential files of users using Ethereum blockchain. We also evaluate the proposed system using performance parameters like query and transaction latency by varying the load and number of nodes of the blockchain network.
Cloud computing is cutting-edge platform in this information age, where organizations are shifting their business due to its elasticity, ubiquity, cost-effectiveness. Unfortunately the cyber criminals has used these characteristics for the criminal activities and victimizing multiple users at the same time, by their single exploitation which was impossible in before. Cloud forensics is a special branch of digital forensics, which aims to find the evidences of the exploitation in order to present these evidences in the court of law and bring the culprit to accountability. Collection of evidences in the cloud is not as simple as the traditional digital forensics because of its complex distributed architecture which is scattered globally. In this paper, various issues and challenges in the field of cloud forensics research and their proposed solutions have been critically reviewed, summarized and presented.
The use of typing biometrics—the characteristic typing patterns of individual keyboard users—has been studied extensively in the context of enhancing multi-factor authentication services. The key starting point for such work has been the collection of high-fidelity local timing data, and the key (implicit) security assumption has been that such biometrics could not be obtained by other means. We show that the latter assumption to be false, and that it is entirely feasible to obtain useful typing biometric signatures from third-party timing logs. Specifically, we show that the logs produced by realtime collaboration services during their normal operation are of sufficient fidelity to successfully impersonate a user using remote data only. Since the logs are routinely shared as a byproduct of the services' operation, this creates an entirely new avenue of attack that few users would be aware of. As a proof of concept, we construct successful biometric attacks using only the log-based structure (complete editing history) of a shared Google Docs, or Zoho Writer, document which is readily available to all contributing parties. Using the largest available public data set of typing biometrics, we are able to create successful forgeries 100% of the time against a commercial biometric service. Our results suggest that typing biometrics are not robust against practical forgeries, and should not be given the same weight as other authentication factors. Another important implication is that the routine collection of detailed timing logs by various online services also inherently (and implicitly) contains biometrics. This not only raises obvious privacy concerns, but may also undermine the effectiveness of network anonymization solutions, such as ToR, when used with existing services.