Biblio

Automatic test systems designed to validate the performance of military and aerospace products have always been held to a higher standard; moreover, emerging threats to data security and instrumentation integrity continue to raise this bar. Engineers are faced with growing pressure to not only ensure that the unit under test (UUT) meets all design criteria, but that it remains safe from malicious attacks aimed at gaining access to test parameters or results, controlling of test sequences and functionality, downloading malware, or impacting functionality by way of counterfeit parts installed in instrumentation. This paper will delve into the cybersecurity issue from the perspective of the test development environment, including the use of test executives, and the challenges associated with minimizing impact to data integrity and access to control. An undetected data breach on military / aerospace automated test equipment (ATE) holds significance beyond just the test system, since mission critical electronics associated with avionics, radar, electronic warfare and missile assemblies must also be protected. One topic discussed will be the impact of adopting methods and procedures detailed in the Department of Defense's (DoD) Application Security Technical Implementation Guide, which is based on NIST documents and details how to manage and maintain a secure software-based system such as an ATE system. Another aspect of cybersecurity that is often overlooked in the world of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) instrumentation and switching systems is the potential impact on the UUT from substandard counterfeit parts and those embedded with malware. Concerns with counterfeit material can encompass a range of threats including the re-purposing of used parts and new knockoff parts with substandard operating characteristics represented and sold as new hardware. One of the most concerning aspects, parts intentionally infected with malware, can pose a significant risk to personnel and national security. We will discuss various strategies aimed at countering these threats, including the adoption of policies and procedures outlined in AS9100D and AS5553, which can mitigate these risks.

To address cybersecurity, this author proposed recently the approach of formulating it in symmetric dual-space and dual-system. This paper further explains this concept, beginning with symmetric Maxwell Equation (ME) and Fourier Transform (FT). The approach appears to be a powerful solution, with wide applications ranging from Electronic Warfare (EW) to 5G Mobile, etc.

The area of military operations is presently a peculiar, heterogenic environment providing the decision-makers with varied data and information on the potential or the real enemy. However the vast number and diversity of the available information does not facilitate the decision process. The achievement of information advantage in line with the rule: the first to notice, the first to understand and the first to act depends among other things on the proper information processing. In the theory of Electronic Warfare, the processing of information about the electronic objects of the enemy emitting electromagnetic energy is realized by Signals Intelligence. The fastest processing of information in the information system of Signals Intelligence is presently provided by cybernetic environment. The construction of an information processing system in the cybernetic environment of Signals Intelligence is thus a very complex task. The article presents theoretical basis of information processing in cybernetic environment of Signals Intelligence based on research carried out by the authors. The article can be described as the added value since it presents and clarifies a complex concept of cybernetic environment of Signal Intelligence. Moreover, it provides a new definition of information process as a system of operations on intelligence information and data. It also presents the stages of information process as well as the structure of information processing process. In the further part it shows the factors and elements of the cybernetic environment of Signals Intelligence isolated in the process of research. The document provides a perspective for the processing of information in the cybernetic environment of Signals Intelligence, it fills the gap in research on information processing in the cybernetic environment of Signals Intelligence as well as assures strong theoretical basis and provides an incentive for further research on the information processing in the cybernetic environment of Signals Intelligence.

For decades, embedded systems, ranging from intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) sensors to electronic warfare and electronic signal intelligence systems, have been an integral part of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) mission systems. These embedded systems are increasingly the targets of deliberate and sophisticated attacks. Developers thus need to focus equally on functionality and security in both hardware and software development. For critical missions, these systems must be entrusted to perform their intended functions, prevent attacks, and even operate with resilience under attacks. The processor in a critical system must thus provide not only a root of trust, but also a foundation to monitor mission functions, detect anomalies, and perform recovery. We have developed a Lincoln Asymmetric Multicore Processing (LAMP) architecture, which mitigates adversarial cyber effects with separation and cryptography and provides a foundation to build a resilient embedded system. We will describe a design environment that we have created to enable the co-design of functionality and security for mission assurance.