Visible to the public Functionality and Security Co-Design Environment for Embedded Systems

TitleFunctionality and Security Co-Design Environment for Embedded Systems
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2018
AuthorsLeemaster, J., Vai, M., Whelihan, D., Whitman, H., Khazan, R.
Conference Name2018 IEEE High Performance Extreme Computing Conference (HPEC)
PublisherIEEE
ISBN Number978-1-5386-5989-2
Keywordsadversarial cyber effects, anomalies detection, asymmetric multicore processing, Availability, co-design, co-design environment, command and control systems, Complexity theory, computer network security, critical missions, cryptography, deliberate attacks, department of defense mission systems, DoD, electronic signal intelligence systems, electronic warfare, Embedded systems, functionality, Hardware, hardware development, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance sensors, Lincoln asymmetric multicore processing architecture, Mission Assurance, mission functions, Multicore processing, multiprocessing systems, pubcrawl, recovery, resilience, Resiliency, resilient embedded system, Resilient Security Architectures, Secure Processing, security, Software development, Sophisticated Attacks, surveillance, System recovery, testbed
Abstract

For decades, embedded systems, ranging from intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) sensors to electronic warfare and electronic signal intelligence systems, have been an integral part of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) mission systems. These embedded systems are increasingly the targets of deliberate and sophisticated attacks. Developers thus need to focus equally on functionality and security in both hardware and software development. For critical missions, these systems must be entrusted to perform their intended functions, prevent attacks, and even operate with resilience under attacks. The processor in a critical system must thus provide not only a root of trust, but also a foundation to monitor mission functions, detect anomalies, and perform recovery. We have developed a Lincoln Asymmetric Multicore Processing (LAMP) architecture, which mitigates adversarial cyber effects with separation and cryptography and provides a foundation to build a resilient embedded system. We will describe a design environment that we have created to enable the co-design of functionality and security for mission assurance.

URLhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8547516
DOI10.1109/HPEC.2018.8547516
Citation Keyleemaster_functionality_2018