Biblio

Numerous antenna design approaches for wearable applications have been investigated in the literature. As on-body wearable communications become more ingrained in our daily activities, the necessity to investigate the impacts of these networks burgeons as a major requirement. In this study, we investigate the human electromagnetic field (EMF) exposure effect from on-body wearable devices at 2.4 GHz and 60 GHz, and compare the results to illustrate how the technology evolution to higher frequencies from wearable communications can impact our health. Our results suggest the average specific absorption rate (SAR) at 60 GHz can exceed the regulatory guidelines within a certain separation distance between a wearable device and the human skin surface. To the best of authors' knowledge, this is the first work that explicitly compares the human EMF exposure at different operating frequencies for on-body wearable communications, which provides a direct roadmap in design of wearable devices to be deployed in the Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT).

Recent advances in Cross-Technology Communication (CTC) enable the coexistence and collaboration among heterogeneous wireless devices operating in the same ISM band (e.g., Wi-Fi, ZigBee, and Bluetooth in 2.4 GHz). However, state-of-the-art CTC schemes are vulnerable to spoofing attacks since there is no practice authentication mechanism yet. This paper proposes a scheme to enable the spoofing attack detection for CTC in heterogeneous wireless networks by using physical layer information. First, we propose a model to detect ZigBee packets and measure the corresponding Received Signal Strength (RSS) on Wi-Fi devices. Then, we design a collaborative mechanism between Wi-Fi and ZigBee devices to detect the spoofing attack. Finally, we implement and evaluate our methods through experiments on commercial off-the- shelf (COTS) Wi-Fi and ZigBee devices. Our results show that it is possible to measure the RSS of ZigBee packets on Wi-Fi device and detect spoofing attack with both a high detection rate and a low false positive rate in heterogeneous wireless networks.

Current BLE transmitters are susceptible to selective jamming due to long dwell times in a channel. To mitigate these attacks, we propose physical-layer security through an ultra-fast bit-level frequency-hopping (FH) scheme by exploiting the frequency agility of bulk acoustic wave resonators (BAW). Here we demonstrate the first integrated bit-level FH transmitter (TX) that hops at 1$μ$s period and uses data-driven random dynamic channel selection to enable secure wireless communications with additional data encryption. This system consists of a time-interleaved BAW-based TX implemented in 65nm CMOS technology with 80MHz coverage in the 2.4GHz ISM band and a measured power consumption of 10.9mW from 1.1V supply.