Biblio
This paper studies the physical layer security (PLS) of a vehicular network employing a reconfigurable intelligent surface (RIS). RIS technologies are emerging as an important paradigm for the realisation of smart radio environments, where large numbers of small, low-cost and passive elements, reflect the incident signal with an adjustable phase shift without requiring a dedicated energy source. Inspired by the promising potential of RIS-based transmission, we investigate two vehicular network system models: One with vehicle-to-vehicle communication with the source employing a RIS-based access point, and the other model in the form of a vehicular adhoc network (VANET), with a RIS-based relay deployed on a building. Both models assume the presence of an eavesdropper to investigate the average secrecy capacity of the considered systems. Monte-Carlo simulations are provided throughout to validate the results. The results show that performance of the system in terms of the secrecy capacity is affected by the location of the RIS-relay and the number of RIS cells. The effect of other system parameters such as source power and eavesdropper distances are also studied.
We investigate large wireless networks subject to security constraints. In contrast to point-to-point, interference-limited communications considered in prior works, we propose active cooperative relaying based schemes. We consider a network with nl legitimate nodes and ne eavesdroppers, and path loss exponent α ≥ 2. As long as ne2(log(ne))γ = o(nl) holds for some positive γ, we show one can obtain unbounded secure aggregate rate. This means zero-cost secure communication, given a fixed total power constraint for the entire network. We achieve this result with (i) the source using Wyner randomized encoder and a serial (multi-stage) block Markov scheme, to cooperate with the relays, and (ii) the relays acting as a virtual multi-antenna to apply beamforming against the eavesdroppers. Our simpler parallel (two-stage) relaying scheme can achieve the same unbounded secure aggregate rate when neα/2 + 1 (log(ne))γ+δ(α/2+1) = o(nl) holds, for some positive γ, δ.