Biblio

In this paper, the problem of misinformation propagation is studied for an Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) system in which an attacker seeks to inject false information in the IoBT nodes in order to compromise the IoBT operations. In the considered model, each IoBT node seeks to counter the misinformation attack by finding the optimal probability of accepting a given information that minimizes its cost at each time instant. The cost is expressed in terms of the quality of information received as well as the infection cost. The problem is formulated as a mean-field game with multiclass agents which is suitable to model a massive heterogeneous IoBT system. For this game, the mean-field equilibrium is characterized, and an algorithm based on the forward backward sweep method is proposed. Then, the finite IoBT case is considered, and the conditions of convergence of the equilibria in the finite case to the mean-field equilibrium are presented. Numerical results show that the proposed scheme can achieve a two-fold increase in the quality of information (QoI) compared to the baseline when the nodes are always transmitting.

Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) has shorter key length than other asymmetric cryptography algorithms such as RSA with the same security level. Existing faults in cryptographic computations can cause faulty results. If a fault occurs during encryption, false information will be sent to the destination, in which case channel error detection codes are unable to detect the fault. In this paper, we consider the error detection in elliptic curve scalar multiplication point, which is the most important operation in ECC. Our technique is based on non-linear error detection codes. We consider an algorithm for scalar multiplication point proposed by Microsoft research group. The proposed technique in our methods has less overhead for additions (36.36%) and multiplications (34.84%) in total, compared to previous works. Also, the proposed method can detect almost 100% of injected faults.

Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) play an essential role in ensuring safe, reliable and faster transportation with the help of an Intelligent Transportation system. The trustworthiness of vehicles in VANETs is extremely important to ensure the authenticity of messages and traffic information transmitted in extremely dynamic topographical conditions where vehicles move at high speed. False or misleading information may cause substantial traffic congestions, road accidents and may even cost lives. Many approaches exist in literature to measure the trustworthiness of GPS data and messages of an Autonomous Vehicle (AV). To the best of our knowledge, they have not considered the trustworthiness of other On-Board Unit (OBU) components of an AV, along with GPS data and transmitted messages, though they have a substantial relevance in overall vehicle trust measurement. In this paper, we introduce a novel model to measure the overall trustworthiness of an AV considering four different OBU components additionally. The performance of the proposed method is evaluated with a traffic simulation model developed by Simulation of Urban Mobility (SUMO) using realistic traffic data and considering different levels of uncertainty.

In Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communications, malicious actors may spread false information to undermine the safety and efficiency of the vehicular traffic stream. Thus, vehicles must determine how to respond to the contents of messages which maybe false even though they are authenticated in the sense that receivers can verify contents were not tampered with and originated from a verifiable transmitter. Existing solutions to find appropriate actions are inadequate since they separately address trust and decision, require the honest majority (more honest ones than malicious), and do not incorporate driver preferences in the decision-making process. In this work, we propose a novel trust-aware decision-making framework without requiring an honest majority. It securely determines the likelihood of reported road events despite the presence of false data, and consequently provides the optimal decision for the vehicles. The basic idea of our framework is to leverage the implied effect of the road event to verify the consistency between each vehicle's reported data and actual behavior, and determine the data trustworthiness and event belief by integrating the Bayes' rule and Dempster Shafer Theory. The resulting belief serves as inputs to a utility maximization framework focusing on both safety and efficiency. This framework considers the two basic necessities of the Intelligent Transportation System and also incorporates drivers' preferences to decide the optimal action. Simulation results show the robustness of our framework under the multiple-vehicle attack, and different balances between safety and efficiency can be achieved via selecting appropriate human preference factors based on the driver's risk-taking willingness.