Biblio
Technical debt is an analogy introduced in 1992 by Cunningham to help explain how intentional decisions not to follow a gold standard or best practice in order to save time or effort during creation of software can later on lead to a product of lower quality in terms of product quality itself, reliability, maintainability or extensibility. Little work has been done so far that applies this analogy to cyber physical (production) systems (CP(P)S). Also there is only little work that uses this analogy for security related issues. This work aims to fill this gap: We want to find out which security related symptoms within the field of cyber physical production systems can be traced back to TD items during all phases, from requirements and design down to maintenance and operation. This work shall support experts from the field by being a first step in exploring the relationship between not following security best practices and concrete increase of costs due to TD as consequence.
As the connectivity within manufacturing processes increases in light of Industry 4.0, information security becomes a pressing issue for product suppliers, systems integrators, and asset owners. Reaching new heights in digitizing the manufacturing industry also provides more targets for cyber attacks, hence, cyber-physical production systems (CPPSs) must be adequately secured to prevent malicious acts. To achieve a sufficient level of security, proper defense mechanisms must be integrated already early on in the systems' lifecycle and not just eventually in the operation phase. Although standardization efforts exist with the objective of guiding involved stakeholders toward the establishment of a holistic industrial security concept (e.g., IEC 62443), a dedicated security development lifecycle for systems integrators is missing. This represents a major challenge for engineers who lack sufficient information security knowledge, as they may not be able to identify security-related activities that can be performed along the production systems engineering (PSE) process. In this paper, we propose a novel methodology named Security Development Lifecycle for Cyber-Physical Production Systems (SDL-CPPS) that aims to foster security by design for CPPSs, i.e., the engineering of smart production systems with security in mind. More specifically, we derive security-related activities based on (i) security standards and guidelines, and (ii) relevant literature, leading to a security-improved PSE process that can be implemented by systems integrators. Furthermore, this paper informs domain experts on how they can conduct these security-enhancing activities and provides pointers to relevant works that may fill the potential knowledge gap. Finally, we review the proposed approach by means of discussions in a workshop setting with technical managers of an Austrian-based systems integrator to identify barriers to adopting the SDL-CPPS.