Biblio

Digital signatures are increasingly used today. It replaces wet signature with the development of technology. Elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) is used in many applications thanks to its security and efficiency. However, some mathematical operations such as inversion operation in modulation slow down the speed of this algorithm. In this study, we propose a more efficient and secure ECDSA. In the proposed method, the inversion operation in modulation of signature generation and signature verification phases is removed. Thus, the efficiency and speed of the ECDSA have been increased without reducing its security. The proposed method is implemented in Python programming language using P-521 elliptic curve and SHA-512 algorithm.

An experiment and numerical simulations analyze low-speed OSC derived XPM-induced phase noise penalty in 100-Gbps WDM systems. WDM transmission performance exhibits signal bit-pattern dependence on OSC, which is due to deterioration in SD-FEC performance.

We demonstrate secure fiber-optic transmission utilizing quantum-noise signal masking by 217-level random phase modulation. Masking of 157 signal phase levels at a BER of HD-FEC threshold is achieved without significant impacts on the transmission performance.

In this work we present a novel technique for physical layer security in the Internet-of-Things (IoT) networks. In the proposed architecture, each IoT node generates a phase-modulated random key/data and transmits it to a master node in the presence of an eavesdropper, referred to as Eve. The master node, simultaneously, broadcasts a high power signal using an omni-directional antenna, which is received as interference by Eve. This interference masks the generated key by the IoT node and will result in a higher bit-error rate in the data received by Eve. The two legitimate intended nodes communicate in a full-duplex manner and, consequently, subtract their transmitted signals, as a known reference, from the received signal (self-interference cancellation). We compare our proposed method with a conventional approach to physical layer security based on directional antennas. In particular, we show, using theoretical and measurement results, that our proposed approach provides significantly better security measures, in terms bit error rate (BER) at Eve's location. Also, it is proven that in our novel system, the possible eavesdropping region, defined by the region with BER \textbackslashtextless; 10-1, is always smaller than the reliable communication region with BER \textbackslashtextless; 10-3.

The security of current key exchange protocols such as Diffie-Hellman key exchange is based on the hardness of number theoretic problems. However, these key exchange protocols are threatened by weak random number generators, advances to CPU power, a new attack from the eavesdropper, and the emergence of a quantum computer. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) addresses these challenges by using quantum properties to exchange a secret key without the risk of being intercepted. Recent developments on the QKD system resulted in a stable key generation with fewer errors so that the QKD system is rapidly becoming a solid commercial proposition. However, although the security of the QKD system is guaranteed by quantum physics, its careless implementation could make the system vulnerable. In this paper, we proposed the first side-channel attack on plug-and-play QKD system. Through a single electromagnetic trace obtained from the phase modulator on Alice's side, we were able to classify the electromagnetic trace into four classes, which corresponds to the number of bit and basis combination in the BB84 protocol. We concluded that the plug-and-play QKD system is vulnerable to side-channel attack so that the countermeasure must be considered.