Biblio

Data security has become an increasing concern with rampant data security regulation changes and the rampant deployment of technology. The necessity to lock down user data has never been greater. This research contributes to the secure software development of Android applications by identifying data processing concerns following the guidelines put forth by the Open Web Application Security Project “(OWASP) Mobile Top 10.” We found that 43.62% of the applications contained at least one security violation. We will be using an open source tool static analysis tool, MobSF, to review the security of 200 health related Android applications. The security of healthcare related applications should be given special attention, as they store and process highly sensitive information such as blood pressures, pulse rate, body photos, mental-state, OBGYN status, and sleep patterns. Partial automation techniques were utilized. This paper also suggests possible security remediations for the identified security concerns.

Android applications (Apps) have penetrated almost every aspect of our lives, bring users great convenience as well as security concerns. Even though Android system adopts permission mechanism to restrict Apps from accessing important resources of a smartphone, such as telephony, camera and GPS location, users face still significant risk of privacy leakage due to the overprivileged permissions. The overprivileged permission means the extra permission declared by the App but has nothing to do with its function. Unfortunately, there doesn't exist any tool for ordinary users to detect the overprivileged permission of an App, hence most users grant any permission declared by the App, intensifying the risk of private information leakage. Although some previous studies tried to solve the problem of permission overprivilege, their methods are not applicable nowadays because of the progress of App protection technology and the update of Android system. Towards this end, we develop a user-friendly tool based on frequent item set mining for the detection of overprivileged permissions of Android Apps, which is named Droidtector. Droidtector can operate in online or offline mode and users can choose any mode according to their situation. Finally, we run Droidtector on 1000 Apps crawled from Google Play and find that 479 of them are overprivileged, accounting for about 48% of all the sample Apps.

Today, the privacy and the security of any organization are the key requirement, the digital online transaction of money or coins also needed a certain level of security not only during the broadcasting of the transaction but before the sending of the transaction. In this research paper we proposed and implemented a cryptocurrency (Bitcoin) wallet for the android operating system, by using the QR code-based android application and a secure private key storage (Cold Wallet). Two android applications have been implemented one of them is called cold wallet and the other one is hot wallet. Cold wallet (offline) is to store and generate the private key addresses for secure transaction confirmation and the hot wallet is used to send bitcoin to the network. Hot wallet application gives facility to the user view history of performed transactions, to send and compose a new bitcoin transaction, receive bitcoin, sign it and send it to the network. By using the process of cross QR code scanning of the hot and cold wallet to the identification, validation and authentication of the user made it secure.

Dynamic Taint Analysis (DTA) technique has been developed for analysis and understanding behavior of Android applications and privacy policy enforcement. Meanwhile, implicit information flows (IIFs) are major concern of security researchers because IIFs can evade DTA technique easily and give attackers an advantage over the researchers. Some researchers suggested approaches to the issue and developed analysis systems supporting privacy policy enforcement against IIF-accompanied attacks; however, there is still no effective technique of comprehensive analysis and privacy policy enforcement against IIF-accompanied attacks. In this paper, we propose an IIF detection technique to enforce privacy policy against IIF-accompanied attacks in Android applications. We developed a new analysis tool, called Smalien, that can discover data leakage caused by IIF-contained information flows as well as explicit information flows. We demonstrated practicability of Smalien by applying it to 16 IIF tricks from ScrubDroid and two IIF tricks from DroidBench. Smalien enforced privacy policy successfully against all the tricks except one trick because the trick loads code dynamically from a remote server at runtime, and Smalien cannot analyze any code outside of a target application. The results show that our approach can be a solution to the current attacker-superior situation.

The Android mobile platform supports billions of devices across more than 190 countries around the world. This popularity coupled with user data collection by Android apps has made privacy protection a well-known challenge in the Android ecosystem. In practice, app producers provide privacy policies disclosing what information is collected and processed by the app. However, it is difficult to trace such claims to the corresponding app code to verify whether the implementation is consistent with the policy. Existing approaches for privacy policy alignment focus on information directly accessed through the Android platform (e.g., location and device ID), but are unable to handle user input, a major source of private information. In this paper, we propose a novel approach that automatically detects privacy leaks of user-entered data for a given Android app and determines whether such leakage may violate the app's privacy policy claims. For evaluation, we applied our approach to 120 popular apps from three privacy-relevant app categories: finance, health, and dating. The results show that our approach was able to detect 21 strong violations and 18 weak violations from the studied apps.

Exfiltrating sensitive information from smartphones has become one of the most significant security threats. We have built a system to identify HTTP-based information exfiltration of malicious Android applications. In this paper, we discuss the method to track the propagation of sensitive information in Android applications using static taint analysis. We have studied the leaked information, destinations to which information is exfiltrated, and their correlations with types of sensitive information. The analysis results based on 578 malicious Android applications have revealed that a significant portion of these applications are interested in identity-related sensitive information. The vast majority of malicious applications leak multiple types of sensitive information. We have also identified servers associated with three country codes including CN, US, and SG are most active in collecting sensitive information. The analysis results have also demonstrated that a wide range of non-default ports are used by suspicious URLs.

Most mobile applications generate local data on internal memory with SharedPreference interface of an Android operating system. Therefore, many possible loopholes can access the confidential information such as passwords. We propose a hybrid encryption approach for SharedPreferences to protect the leaking confidential information through the source code. We develop an Android application and store some data using SharedPreference. We produce different experiments with which this data could be accessed. We apply Hybrid encryption approach combining encryption approach with Android Keystore system, for providing better encryption algorithm to hide sensitive data.

The growing popularity of Android applications makes them vulnerable to security threats. There exist several studies that focus on the analysis of the behaviour of Android applications to detect the repackaged and malicious ones. These techniques use a variety of features to model the application's behaviour, among which the calls to Android API, made by the application components, are shown to be the most reliable. To generate the APIs that an application calls is not an easy task. This is because most malicious applications are obfuscated and do not come with the source code. This makes the problem of identifying the API methods invoked by an application an interesting research issue. In this paper, we present HyDroid, a hybrid approach that combines static and dynamic analysis to generate API call traces from the execution of an application's services. We focus on services because they contain key characteristics that allure attackers to misuse them. We show that HyDroid can be used to extract API call trace signatures of several malware families.

Mobile applications frequently access sensitive personal information to meet user or business requirements. Because such information is sensitive in general, regulators increasingly require mobile-app developers to publish privacy policies that describe what information is collected. Furthermore, regulators have fined companies when these policies are inconsistent with the actual data practices of mobile apps. To help mobile-app developers check their privacy policies against their apps' code for consistency, we propose a semi-automated framework that consists of a policy terminology-API method map that links policy phrases to API methods that produce sensitive information, and information flow analysis to detect misalignments. We present an implementation of our framework based on a privacy-policy-phrase ontology and a collection of mappings from API methods to policy phrases. Our empirical evaluation on 477 top Android apps discovered 341 potential privacy policy violations.

Although there has been much research on the leakage of sensitive data in Android applications, most of the existing research focus on how to detect the malware or adware that are intentionally collecting user privacy. There are not much research on analyzing the vulnerabilities of apps that may cause the leakage of privacy. In this paper, we present a vulnerability analyzing method which combines taint analysis and cryptography misuse detection. The four steps of this method are decompile, taint analysis, API call record, cryptography misuse analysis, all of which steps except taint analysis can be executed by the existing tools. We develop a prototype tool PW Exam to analysis how the passwords are handled and if the app is vulnerable to password leakage. Our experiment shows that a third of apps are vulnerable to leak the users' passwords.