Biblio

This paper studies the physical layer security (PLS) of a vehicular network employing a reconfigurable intelligent surface (RIS). RIS technologies are emerging as an important paradigm for the realisation of smart radio environments, where large numbers of small, low-cost and passive elements, reflect the incident signal with an adjustable phase shift without requiring a dedicated energy source. Inspired by the promising potential of RIS-based transmission, we investigate two vehicular network system models: One with vehicle-to-vehicle communication with the source employing a RIS-based access point, and the other model in the form of a vehicular adhoc network (VANET), with a RIS-based relay deployed on a building. Both models assume the presence of an eavesdropper to investigate the average secrecy capacity of the considered systems. Monte-Carlo simulations are provided throughout to validate the results. The results show that performance of the system in terms of the secrecy capacity is affected by the location of the RIS-relay and the number of RIS cells. The effect of other system parameters such as source power and eavesdropper distances are also studied.

Vehicular Ad Hoc Network (VANET) is a promising technology for autonomous driving as it provides many benefits and user conveniences to improve road safety and driving comfort. Sybil attack is one of the most serious threats in vehicular communications because attackers can generate multiple forged identities to disseminate false messages to disrupt safety-related services or misuse the systems. To address this issue, we propose a Sybil attack detection scheme using ADAS (Advanced Driving Assistant System) sensors installed on modern passenger vehicles, without the assistance of trusted third party authorities or infrastructure. Also, a deep learning based object detection technique is used to accurately identify nearby objects for Sybil attack detection and the multi-step verification process minimizes the false positive of the detection.

In this paper, we propose a conditional privacy-preserving authentication scheme based on pseudonyms and (t,n) threshold secret sharing, named CPPT, for vehicular communications. To achieve conditional privacy preservation, our scheme implements anonymous communications based on pseudonyms generated by hash chains. To prevent bad vehicles from conducting framed attacks on honest ones, CPPT introduces Shamir (t,n) threshold secret sharing technique. In addition, through two one-way hash chains, forward security and backward security are guaranteed, and it also optimize the revocation overhead. The size of certificate revocation list (CRL) is only proportional to the number of revoked vehicles and irrelated to how many pseudonymous certificates are held by the revoked vehicles. Extensive simulations demonstrate that CPPT outperforms ECPP, DCS, Hybrid and EMAP schemes in terms of revocation overhead, certificate updating overhead and authentication overhead.

We argue on the need for a dedicated medium access control (MAC) for Vehicular VLC (V-VLC). The huge unlicensed spectrum that can support high throughput applications and the intrinsic security due to the LOS requirement make visible light a viable candidate for use in vehicular communications. In some first research work, the directionality of V-VLC has been considered and an initial conclusion was that the small collision domain leads to negligible interference and, thus, dedicated mechanisms for medium access are unnecessary. However, in a more realistic simulation setup using the Luxembourg mobility model, we are able to show that, in certain geographical areas, the number of transmitters seen at a single receiver can easily grow up to 30. Considering packet transmissions, the interference-induced packet loss can be substantial, reaching up to 13 % during rush hours. We thus make the case that this packet loss should be mitigated with a dedicated MAC for coordinated access control in V-VLC.

Standardization and harmonization efforts have reached a consensus towards using a special-purpose Vehicular Public-Key Infrastructure (VPKI) in upcoming Vehicular Communication (VC) systems. However, there are still several technical challenges with no conclusive answers; one such an important yet open challenge is the acquisition of short-term credentials, pseudonym: how should each vehicle interact with the VPKI, e.g., how frequently and for how long? Should each vehicle itself determine the pseudonym lifetime? Answering these questions is far from trivial. Each choice can affect both the user privacy and the system performance and possibly, as a result, its security. In this paper, we make a novel systematic effort to address this multifaceted question. We craft three generally applicable policies and experimentally evaluate the VPKI system performance, leveraging two large-scale mobility datasets. We consider the most promising, in terms of efficiency, pseudonym acquisition policies; we find that within this class of policies, the most promising policy in terms of privacy protection can be supported with moderate overhead. Moreover, in all cases, this work is the first to provide tangible evidence that the state-of-the-art VPKI can serve sizable areas or domain with modest computing resources.

Vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) provides infrastructure less, rapidly deployable, self-configurable network connectivity. The network is the collection vehicles interlinked by wireless links and willing to store and forward data for their peers. As vehicles move freely and organize themselves arbitrarily, message routing is done dynamically based on network connectivity. Compared with other ad-hoc networks, VANETs are particularly challenging due to the part of the vehicles' high rate of mobility and the numerous signal-weakening barrier, such as buildings, in their environments. Due to their enormous potential, VANET have gained an increasing attention in both industry and academia. Research activities range from lower layer protocol design to applications and implementation issues. A secure VANET system, while exchanging information should protect the system against unauthorized message injection, message alteration, eavesdropping. The security of VANET is one of the most critical issues because their information transmission is propagated in open access (wireless) environments. A few years back VANET has received increased attention as the potential technology to enhance active and preventive safety on the road, as well as travel comfort Safekeeping and privacy are mandatory in vehicular communications for a grateful acceptance and use of such technology. This paper is an attempt to highlight the problems occurred in Vehicular Ad hoc Networks and security issues.

Aside from massive advantages in safety and convenience on the road, Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) introduce security risks to the users. Proposals of new security concepts to counter these risks are challenging to verify because of missing real world implementations of VANETs. To fill this gap, we introduce VANETsim, an event-driven simulation platform, specifically designed to investigate application-level privacy and security implications in vehicular communications. VANETsim focuses on realistic vehicular movement on real road networks and communication between the moving nodes. A powerful graphical user interface and an experimentation environment supports the user when setting up or carrying out experiments.