Visible to the public Privacy-Preserving Authentication Based on Pseudonyms and Secret Sharing for VANET

TitlePrivacy-Preserving Authentication Based on Pseudonyms and Secret Sharing for VANET
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2019
AuthorsXu, Ye, Li, Fengying, Cao, Bin
Conference Name2019 Computing, Communications and IoT Applications (ComComAp)
Date Publishedoct
Keywordsanonymous communications, anonymous messaging, authentication, authentication overhead, authorisation, backward security, certificate revocation list, certificate updating overhead, CPPT, data privacy, DCS schemes, ECPP scheme, EMAP scheme, forward security, framed attacks, hash chain, hash chains, hybrid scheme, message authentication, n) threshold secret sharing, privacy, privacy-preserving authentication, private key cryptography, pseudonymous certificates, pseudonyms, pubcrawl, Public key, resilience, Resiliency, revocation overhead, Roads, Scalability, secret sharing, Shamir (t, telecommunication security, VANET, vehicular ad hoc networks, vehicular communications
AbstractIn this paper, we propose a conditional privacy-preserving authentication scheme based on pseudonyms and (t,n) threshold secret sharing, named CPPT, for vehicular communications. To achieve conditional privacy preservation, our scheme implements anonymous communications based on pseudonyms generated by hash chains. To prevent bad vehicles from conducting framed attacks on honest ones, CPPT introduces Shamir (t,n) threshold secret sharing technique. In addition, through two one-way hash chains, forward security and backward security are guaranteed, and it also optimize the revocation overhead. The size of certificate revocation list (CRL) is only proportional to the number of revoked vehicles and irrelated to how many pseudonymous certificates are held by the revoked vehicles. Extensive simulations demonstrate that CPPT outperforms ECPP, DCS, Hybrid and EMAP schemes in terms of revocation overhead, certificate updating overhead and authentication overhead.
DOI10.1109/ComComAp46287.2019.9018809
Citation Keyxu_privacy-preserving_2019