Biblio

Complex CPS such as UAS got rapid development these years, but also became vulnerable to GPS spoofing, packets injection, buffer-overflow and other malicious attacks. Ensuring the behaviors of UAS always keeping secure no matter how the environment changes, would be a prospective direction for UAS security. This paper aims at presenting a reactive synthesis-based approach to implement the automatic generation of secure UAS controller. First, we study the operating mechanism of UAS and construct a high-Ievel model consisting of actuator and monitor. Besides, we analyze the security threats of UAS from the perspective of hardware, software and data transmission, and then extract the corresponding specifications of security properties with LTL formulas. Based on the UAS model and security specifications, the controller can be constructed by GR(1) synthesis algorithm, which is a two-player game process between UAV and Environment. Finally, we expand the function of LTLMoP platform to construct the automatons for controller in multi-robots system, which provides secure behavior strategies under several typical UAS attack scenarios.

Cryptographic protocols are the basis for the security of any protected system, including the electronic voting system. One of the most effective ways to analyze protocol security is to use verifiers. In this paper, the formal verifier SPIN was used to analyze the security of the cryptographic protocol for e-voting, which is based on model checking using linear temporal logic (LTL). The cryptographic protocol of electronic voting is described. The main structural units of the Promela language used for simulation in the SPIN verifier are described. The model of the electronic voting protocol in the language Promela is given. The interacting parties, transferred data, the order of the messages transmitted between the parties are described. Security of the cryptographic protocol using the SPIN tool is verified. The simulation of the protocol with active intruder using the man in the middle attack (MITM) to substitute data is made. In the simulation results it is established that the protocol correctly handles the case of an active attack on the parties' authentication.