Visible to the public Biblio

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2023-04-14
Salcedo, Mathew David, Abid, Mehdi, Kim, Yoohwan, Jo, Ju-Yeon.  2022.  Evil-Twin Browsers: Using Open-Source Code to Clone Browsers for Malicious Purposes. 2022 IEEE 12th Annual Computing and Communication Workshop and Conference (CCWC). :0776—0784.
Browsers are one of the most widely used types of software around the world. This prevalence makes browsers a prime target for cyberattacks. To mitigate these threats, users can practice safe browsing habits and take advantage of the security features available to browsers. These protections, however, could be severely crippled if the browser itself were malicious. Presented in this paper is the concept of the evil-twin browser (ETB), a clone of a legitimate browser that looks and behaves identically to the original browser, but discreetly performs other tasks that harm a user's security. To better understand the concept of the evil-twin browser, a prototype ETB named ChroNe was developed. The creation and installation process of ChroN e is discussed in this paper. This paper also explores the motivation behind creating such a browser, examines existing relevant work, inspects the open-source codebase Chromium that assisted in ChroNe's development, and discusses relevant topics like ways to deliver an ETB, the capabilities of an ETB, and possible ways to defend against ETBs.
2022-12-20
von Zezschwitz, Emanuel, Chen, Serena, Stark, Emily.  2022.  "It builds trust with the customers" - Exploring User Perceptions of the Padlock Icon in Browser UI. 2022 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW). :44–50.
We performed a large-scale online survey (n=1,880) to study the padlock icon, an established security indicator in web browsers that denotes connection security through HTTPS. In this paper, we evaluate users’ understanding of the padlock icon, and how removing or replacing it might influence their expectations and decisions. We found that the majority of respondents (89%) had misconceptions about the padlock’s meaning. While only a minority (23%-44%) referred to the padlock icon at all when asked to evaluate trustworthiness, these padlock-aware users reported that they would be deterred from a hypothetical shopping transaction when the padlock icon was absent. These users were reassured after seeing secondary UI surfaces (i.e., Chrome Page Info) where more verbose information about connection security was present.We conclude that the padlock icon, displayed by browsers in the address bar, is still misunderstood by many users. The padlock icon guarantees connection security, but is often perceived to indicate the general privacy, security, and trustworthiness of a website. We argue that communicating connection security precisely and clearly is likely to be more effective through secondary UI, where there is more surface area for content. We hope that this paper boosts the discussion about the benefits and drawbacks of showing passive security indicators in the browser UI.
ISSN: 2770-8411
Siewert, Hendrik, Kretschmer, Martin, Niemietz, Marcus, Somorovsky, Juraj.  2022.  On the Security of Parsing Security-Relevant HTTP Headers in Modern Browsers. 2022 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW). :342–352.

Web browsers are among the most important but also complex software solutions to access the web. It is therefore not surprising that web browsers are an attractive target for attackers. Especially in the last decade, security researchers and browser vendors have developed sandboxing mechanisms like security-relevant HTTP headers to tackle the problem of getting a more secure browser. Although the security community is aware of the importance of security-relevant HTTP headers, legacy applications and individual requests from different parties have led to possible insecure configurations of these headers. Even if specific security headers are configured correctly, conflicts in their functionalities may lead to unforeseen browser behaviors and vulnerabilities. Recently, the first work which analyzed duplicated headers and conflicts in headers was published by Calzavara et al. at USENIX Security [1]. The authors focused on inconsistent protections by using both, the HTTP header X-Frame-Options and the framing protection of the Content-Security-Policy.We extend their work by analyzing browser behaviors when parsing duplicated headers, conflicting directives, and values that do not conform to the defined ABNF metalanguage specification. We created an open-source testbed running over 19,800 test cases, at which nearly 300 test cases are executed in the set of 66 different browsers. Our work shows that browsers conform to the specification and behave securely. However, all tested browsers behave differently when it comes, for example, to parsing the Strict-Transport-Security header. Moreover, Chrome, Safari, and Firefox behave differently if the header contains a character, which is not allowed by the defined ABNF. This results in the protection mechanism being fully enforced, partially enforced, or not enforced and thus completely bypassable.

ISSN: 2770-8411

2021-04-27
Obaidat, M., Brown, J., Hayajneh, A. A..  2020.  Web Browser Extension User-Script XSS Vulnerabilities. 2020 IEEE Intl Conf on Dependable, Autonomic and Secure Computing, Intl Conf on Pervasive Intelligence and Computing, Intl Conf on Cloud and Big Data Computing, Intl Conf on Cyber Science and Technology Congress (DASC/PiCom/CBDCom/CyberSciTech). :316—321.

Browser extensions have by and large become a normal and accepted omnipresent feature within modern browsers. However, since their inception, browser extensions have remained under scrutiny for opening vulnerabilities for users. While a large amount of effort has been dedicated to patching such issues as they arise, including the implementation of extension sandboxes and explicit permissions, issues remain within the browser extension ecosystem through user-scripts. User-scripts, or micro-script extensions hosted by a top-level extension, are largely unregulated but inherit the permissions of the top-level application manager, which popularly includes extensions such as Greasemonkey, Tampermonkey, or xStyle. While most user-scripts are docile and serve a specific beneficial functionality, due to their inherently open nature and the unregulated ecosystem, they are easy for malicious parties to exploit. Common attacks through this method involve hijacking of DOM elements to execute malicious javascript and/or XSS attacks, although other more advanced attacks can be deployed as well. User-scripts have not received much attention, and this vulnerability has persisted despite attempts to make browser extensions more secure. This ongoing vulnerability remains an unknown threat to many users who employ user-scripts, and circumvents security mechanisms otherwise put in place by browsers. This paper discusses this extension derivative vulnerability as it pertains to current browser security paradigms.

2020-04-17
Kiss, Ákos, Hodován, Renáta.  2019.  Security-Related Commits in Open Source Web Browser Projects. 2019 34th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Automated Software Engineering Workshop (ASEW). :57—60.

The security of web browsers is of paramount importance, these days perhaps more than ever. Unfortunately, acquiring real data for security-related research is not an easy task, as access to sensitive information is rarely granted to researchers who are not members of a trusted security team. In this paper, we describe a method to mine security-related commits from open source software repositories, even if the reports of already fixed security issues have access restrictions, and we show the applicability of the method on two popular web browser projects. We also made the mined dataset available, listing more than 13,000 security-related commits, with which we hope to facilitate research on security-targeted bug prediction.

2020-01-28
Monaco, John V..  2019.  Feasibility of a Keystroke Timing Attack on Search Engines with Autocomplete. 2019 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW). :212–217.
Many websites induce the browser to send network traffic in response to user input events. This includes websites with autocomplete, a popular feature on search engines that anticipates the user's query while they are typing. Websites with this functionality require HTTP requests to be made as the query input field changes, such as when the user presses a key. The browser responds to input events by generating network traffic to retrieve the search predictions. The traffic emitted by the client can expose the timings of keyboard input events which may lead to a keylogging side channel attack whereby the query is revealed through packet inter-arrival times. We investigate the feasibility of such an attack on several popular search engines by characterizing the behavior of each website and measuring information leakage at the network level. Three out of the five search engines we measure preserve the mutual information between keystrokes and timings to within 1% of what it is on the host. We describe the ways in which two search engines mitigate this vulnerability with minimal effects on usability.
2019-02-08
Wang, M., Zhu, W., Yan, S., Wang, Q..  2018.  SoundAuth: Secure Zero-Effort Two-Factor Authentication Based on Audio Signals. 2018 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS). :1-9.

Two-factor authentication (2FA) popularly works by verifying something the user knows (a password) and something she possesses (a token, popularly instantiated with a smart phone). Conventional 2FA systems require extra interaction like typing a verification code, which is not very user-friendly. For improved user experience, recent work aims at zero-effort 2FA, in which a smart phone placed close to a computer (where the user enters her username/password into a browser to log into a server) automatically assists with the authentication. To prove her possession of the smart phone, the user needs to prove the phone is on the login spot, which reduces zero-effort 2FA to co-presence detection. In this paper, we propose SoundAuth, a secure zero-effort 2FA mechanism based on (two kinds of) ambient audio signals. SoundAuth looks for signs of proximity by having the browser and the smart phone compare both their surrounding sounds and certain unpredictable near-ultrasounds; if significant distinguishability is found, SoundAuth rejects the login request. For the ambient signals comparison, we regard it as a classification problem and employ a machine learning technique to analyze the audio signals. Experiments with real login attempts show that SoundAuth not only is comparable to existent schemes concerning utility, but also outperforms them in terms of resilience to attacks. SoundAuth can be easily deployed as it is readily supported by most smart phones and major browsers.

2018-02-15
Ramatsakane, K. I., Leung, W. S..  2017.  Pick location security: Seamless integrated multi-factor authentication. 2017 IST-Africa Week Conference (IST-Africa). :1–10.

Authentication is one of the key aspects of securing applications and systems alike. While in most existing systems this is achieved using usernames and passwords it has been continuously shown that this authentication method is not secure. Studies that have been conducted have shown that these systems have vulnerabilities which lead to cases of impersonation and identity theft thus there is need to improve such systems to protect sensitive data. In this research, we explore the combination of the user's location together with traditional usernames and passwords as a multi factor authentication system to make authentication more secure. The idea involves comparing a user's mobile device location with that of the browser and comparing the device's Bluetooth key with the key used during registration. We believe by leveraging existing technologies such as Bluetooth and GPS we can reduce implementation costs whilst improving security.

2017-12-20
Narvekar, A. N., Joshi, K. K..  2017.  Security sandbox model for modern web environment. 2017 International Conference on Nascent Technologies in Engineering (ICNTE). :1–6.
We require a very good technical knowledge to create automated tests to exploit the browser vulnerabilities. It is usually a combination of technical abilities and set of specific tools. Security concerns is of prime importance when it comes to web browsers. Attacks during surfing, executing any downloaded file and while transmission are very frequent these days and hence all browsers need to be hardened to ensure security. Sandbox is one of the feature where we can prevent malicious applications to run directly on hardware. It is an environment where new or non-trusted applications are executed. Many leading web browsers are trying their level best to implement sandbox. In this paper, we have mentioned the basic necessity of sandbox, current implementations in different web browsers and also present a self-proposed approach.
2017-09-11
Baumann, Peter, Katzenbeisser, Stefan, Stopczynski, Martin, Tews, Erik.  2016.  Disguised Chromium Browser: Robust Browser, Flash and Canvas Fingerprinting Protection. Proceedings of the 2016 ACM on Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society. :37–46.

Browser fingerprinting is a widely used technique to uniquely identify web users and to track their online behavior. Until now, different tools have been proposed to protect the user against browser fingerprinting. However, these tools have usability restrictions as they deactivate browser features and plug-ins (like Flash) or the HTML5 canvas element. In addition, all of them only provide limited protection, as they randomize browser settings with unrealistic parameters or have methodical flaws, making them detectable for trackers. In this work we demonstrate the first anti-fingerprinting strategy, which protects against Flash fingerprinting without deactivating it, provides robust and undetectable anti-canvas fingerprinting, and uses a large set of real word data to hide the actual system and browser properties without losing usability. We discuss the methods and weaknesses of existing anti-fingerprinting tools in detail and compare them to our enhanced strategies. Our evaluation against real world fingerprinting tools shows a successful fingerprinting protection in over 99% of 70.000 browser sessions.

2017-04-20
Rao, K. S., Jain, N., Limaje, N., Gupta, A., Jain, M., Menezes, B..  2016.  Two for the price of one: A combined browser defense against XSS and clickjacking. 2016 International Conference on Computing, Networking and Communications (ICNC). :1–6.
Cross Site Scripting (XSS) and clickjacking have been ranked among the top web application threats in recent times. This paper introduces XBuster - our client-side defence against XSS, implemented as an extension to the Mozilla Firefox browser. XBuster splits each HTTP request parameter into HTML and JavaScript contexts and stores them separately. It searches for both contexts in the HTTP response and handles each context type differently. It defends against all XSS attack vectors including partial script injection, attribute injection and HTML injection. Also, existing XSS filters may inadvertently disable frame busting code used in web pages as a defence against clickjacking. However, XBuster has been designed to detect and neutralize such attempts.
2017-02-21
H. S. Jeon, H. Jung, W. Chun.  2015.  "An extended web browser for id/locator separation network". 2015 International Conference on Information and Communication Technology Convergence (ICTC). :749-754.

With the pretty prompt growth in Internet content, the main usage pattern of internet is shifting from traditional host-to-host model to content dissemination model. To support content distribution, content delivery networks (CDNs) gives an ad-hoc solution and some of future internet projects suggest a clean-slate design. Web applications have become one of the fundamental internet services. How to effectively support the popular browser-based web application is one of keys to success for future internet projects. This paper proposes the IDNet-based web applications. IDNet consists of id/locator separation scheme and domain-insulated autonomous network architecture (DIANA) which redesign the future internet in the clean slate basis. We design and develop an IDNet Browser based on the open source Qt. IDNet browser enables ID fetching and rendering by both `idp:/' schemes URID (Universal Resource Identifier) and `http:/' schemes URI in HTML The experiment shows that it can well be applicable to the IDNet test topology.

H. S. Jeon, H. Jung, W. Chun.  2015.  "ID Based Web Browser with P2P Property". 2015 9th International Conference on Future Generation Communication and Networking (FGCN). :41-44.

The main usage pattern of internet is shifting from traditional host-to-host central model to content dissemination model. It leads to the pretty prompt growth in Internet content. CDN and P2P are two mainstream techmologies to provide streaming content services in the current Internet. In recent years, some researchers have begun to focus on CDN-P2P-hybrid architecture and ISP-friendly P2P content delivery technology. Web applications have become one of the fundamental internet services. How to effectively support the popular browser-based web application is one of keys to success for future internet projects. This paper proposes ID based browser with caching in IDNet. IDNet consists of id/locator separation scheme and domain-insulated autonomous network architecture (DIANA) which redesign the future internet in the clean slate basis. Experiment shows that ID web browser with caching function can support how to disseminate content and how to find the closet network in IDNet having identical contents.

2015-05-05
Abgrall, E., le Traon, Y., Gombault, S., Monperrus, M..  2014.  Empirical Investigation of the Web Browser Attack Surface under Cross-Site Scripting: An Urgent Need for Systematic Security Regression Testing. Software Testing, Verification and Validation Workshops (ICSTW), 2014 IEEE Seventh International Conference on. :34-41.

One of the major threats against web applications is Cross-Site Scripting (XSS). The final target of XSS attacks is the client running a particular web browser. During this last decade, several competing web browsers (IE, Netscape, Chrome, Firefox) have evolved to support new features. In this paper, we explore whether the evolution of web browsers is done using systematic security regression testing. Beginning with an analysis of their current exposure degree to XSS, we extend the empirical study to a decade of most popular web browser versions. We use XSS attack vectors as unit test cases and we propose a new method supported by a tool to address this XSS vector testing issue. The analysis on a decade releases of most popular web browsers including mobile ones shows an urgent need of XSS regression testing. We advocate the use of a shared security testing benchmark as a good practice and propose a first set of publicly available XSS vectors as a basis to ensure that security is not sacrificed when a new version is delivered.