Biblio
Content blocking is an important part of a per-formant, user-serving, privacy respecting web. Current content blockers work by building trust labels over URLs. While useful, this approach has many well understood shortcomings. Attackers may avoid detection by changing URLs or domains, bundling unwanted code with benign code, or inlining code in pages.The common flaw in existing approaches is that they evaluate code based on its delivery mechanism, not its behavior. In this work we address this problem by building a system for generating signatures of the privacy-and-security relevant behavior of executed JavaScript. Our system uses as the unit of analysis each script's behavior during each turn on the JavaScript event loop. Focusing on event loop turns allows us to build highly identifying signatures for JavaScript code that are robust against code obfuscation, code bundling, URL modification, and other common evasions, as well as handle unique aspects of web applications.This work makes the following contributions to the problem of measuring and improving content blocking on the web: First, we design and implement a novel system to build per-event-loop-turn signatures of JavaScript behavior through deep instrumentation of the Blink and V8 runtimes. Second, we apply these signatures to measure how much privacy-and-security harming code is missed by current content blockers, by using EasyList and EasyPrivacy as ground truth and finding scripts that have the same privacy and security harming patterns. We build 1,995,444 signatures of privacy-and-security relevant behaviors from 11,212 unique scripts blocked by filter lists, and find 3,589 unique scripts hosting known harmful code, but missed by filter lists, affecting 12.48% of websites measured. Third, we provide a taxonomy of ways scripts avoid detection and quantify the occurrence of each. Finally, we present defenses against these evasions, in the form of filter list additions where possible, and through a proposed, signature based system in other cases.As part of this work, we share the implementation of our signature-generation system, the data gathered by applying that system to the Alexa 100K, and 586 AdBlock Plus compatible filter list rules to block instances of currently blocked code being moved to new URLs.
The accessibility of the internet and mobile platforms has risen dramatically due to digital technology innovations. Web applications have opened up a variety of market possibilities by supplying consumers with a wide variety of digital technologies that benefit from high accessibility and functionality. Around the same time, web application protection continues to be an important challenge on the internet, and security must be taken seriously in order to secure confidential data. The threat is caused by inadequate validation of user input information, software developed without strict adherence to safety standards, vulnerability of reusable software libraries, software weakness, and so on. Through abusing a website's vulnerability, introduers are manipulating the user's information in order to exploit it for their own benefit. Then introduers inject their own malicious code, stealing passwords, manipulating user activities, and infringing on customers' privacy. As a result, information is leaked, applications malfunction, confidential data is accessed, etc. To mitigate the aforementioned issues, stacking ensemble based classifier model for Cross-site scripting (XSS) attack detection is proposed. Furthermore, the stacking ensembles technique is used in combination with different machine learning classification algorithms like k-Means, Random Forest and Decision Tree as base-learners to reliably detect XSS attack. Logistic Regression is used as meta-learner to predict the attack with greater accuracy. The classification algorithms in stacking model explore the problem in their own way and its results are given as input to the meta-learner to make final prediction, thus improving the overall detection accuracy of XSS attack in stacking than the individual models. The simulation findings demonstrate that the proposed model detects XSS attack successfully.
Phishing sends malicious links or attachments through emails that can perform various functions, including capturing the victim's login credentials or account information. These emails harm the victims, cause money loss, and identity theft. In this paper, we contribute to solving the phishing problem by developing an extension for the Google Chrome web browser. In the development of this feature, we used JavaScript PL. To be able to identify and prevent the fishing attack, a combination of Blacklisting and semantic analysis methods was used. Furthermore, a database for phishing sites is generated, and the text, links, images, and other data on-site are analyzed for pattern recognition. Finally, our proposed solution was tested and compared to existing approaches. The results validate that our proposed method is capable of handling the phishing issue substantially.