Biblio
Cybersecurity is a major issue today. It is predicted that cybercrime will cost the world \$6 trillion annually by 2021. It is important to make logins secure as well as to make advances in security in order to catch cybercriminals. This paper will design and create a device that will use Fuzzy logic to identify a person by the rhythm and frequency of their typing. The device will take data from a user from a normal password entry session. This data will be used to make a Fuzzy system that will be able to identify the user by their typing speed. An application of this project could be used to make a more secure log-in system for a user. The log-in system would not only check that the correct password was entered but also that the rhythm of how the password was typed matched the user. Another application of this system could be used to help catch cybercriminals. A cybercriminal may have a certain rhythm at which they type at and this could be used like a fingerprint to help officials locate cybercriminals.
Wide integration of information and communication technology (ICT) in modern power grids has brought many benefits as well as the risk of cyber attacks. A critical step towards defending grid cyber security is to understand the cyber-physical causal chain, which describes the progression of intrusion in cyber-space leading to the formation of consequences on the physical power grid. In this paper, we develop an attack vector for a time delay attack at load frequency control in the power grid. Distinct from existing works, which are separately focused on cyber intrusion, grid response, or testbed validation, the proposed attack vector for the first time provides a full cyber-physical causal chain. It targets specific vulnerabilities in the protocols, performs a denial-of-service (DoS) attack, induces the delays in control loop, and destabilizes grid frequency. The proposed attack vector is proved in theory, presented as an attack tree, and validated in an experimental environment. The results will provide valuable insights to develop security measures and robust controls against time delay attacks.
A time-delay switch (TDS) cyber attack is a deliberate attempt by malicious adversaries aiming at destabilizing a power system by impeding the communication signals to/from the centralized controller from/to the network sensors and generating stations that participate in the load frequency control (LFC). A TDS cyber attack can be targeting the sensing loops (transmitting network measurements to the centralized controller) or the control signals dispatched from the centralized controller to the governor valves of the generating stations. A resilient TDS control strategy is proposed and developed in this work that thwarts network instabilities that are caused by delays in the sensing loops, and control commands, and guarantees normal operation of the LFC mechanism. This will be achieved by augmenting the telemetered control commands with locally generated feedback control laws (i.e., “decentralized” control commands) taking measurements that are available and accessible at the power generating stations (locally) independent from all the telemetered signals to/from the centralized controller. Our objective is to devise a controller that is capable of circumventing all types of TDS and DoS (Denial of Service) cyber attacks as well as a broad class of False Data Injection (FDI) cyber attacks.
This paper deals with effects of current sensor bandwidth and time delays in a system controlled by a Phase-Shift Self-Oscillating Current Controller (PSSOCC). The robustness of this current controller has been proved in former works showing its good performances in a large range of applications including AC/DC and DC/AC converters, power factor correction, active filters, isolation amplifiers and motor control. As switching frequencies can be upper than 30kHz, time delays and bandwidth limitations cannot be neglected in comparison with former works on this robust current controller. Thus, several models are proposed in this paper to analyze system behaviours. Those models permit to find analytical expressions binding maximum oscillation frequency with time delay and/or additional filter parameters. Through current spectrums analysis, quality of analytical expressions is proved for each model presented in this work. An experimental approach shows that every element of the electronic board having a low-pass effect or delaying command signals need to be included in the model in order to have a perfect match between calculations, simulations and practical results.
Cybersecurity in control systems has been actively discussed in recent years. In particular, networked control systems (NCSs) over the Internet are exposed to various types of cyberattacks such as false data injection attacks. This paper proposes a detection and mitigation method of the false data injection attacks in interactive NCSs, i.e., bilateral teleoperation systems. A bilateral teleoperation system exchanges position and force information through the Internet between the master and slave robots. The proposed method utilizes two redundant communication channels for both the master-to-slave and slave-to-master paths. The attacks are detected by a tamper detection observer (TDO) on each of the master and slave sides. The TDO compares the position responses of actual robots and robot models. A path selector on each side chooses the appropriate position and force responses from the responses received through the two communication channels, based on the outputs of the TDO. The proposed method is validated by simulations with attack models.
The time delay of echo generated by the moving target simulator based on digital delay technique is discrete. So there are range and phase errors between the simulated target and real target, and the simulated target will move discontinuously due to the discrete time delay. In order to solve this problem and generate a continuously moving target, this paper uses signal processing technique to adjust the range and phase errors between the two targets. By adjusting the range gate, the time delay error is reduced to be smaller than sampling interval. According to the relationship between range and phase, the left error within one range bin can be removed equivalently by phase compensation. The simulation results show that by adjusting the range gate, the time delay errors are greatly reduced, and the left errors can be removed by phase compensation. In other words, a real continuously moving target is generated and the problem is solved.