Biblio
The steady decline of IP transit prices in the past two decades has helped fuel the growth of traffic demands in the Internet ecosystem. Despite the declining unit pricing, bandwidth costs remain significant due to ever-increasing scale and reach of the Internet, combined with the price disparity between the Internet's core hubs versus remote regions. In the meantime, cloud providers have been auctioning underutilized computing resources in their marketplace as spot instances for a much lower price, compared to their on-demand instances. This state of affairs has led the networking community to devote extensive efforts to cloud-assisted networks - the idea of offloading network functionality to cloud platforms, ultimately leading to more flexible and highly composable network service chains.We initiate a critical discussion on the economic and technological aspects of leveraging cloud-assisted networks for Internet-scale interconnections and data transfers. Namely, we investigate the prospect of constructing a large-scale virtualized network provider that does not own any fixed or dedicated resources and runs atop several spot instances. We construct a cloud-assisted overlay as a virtual network provider, by leveraging third-party cloud spot instances. We identify three use case scenarios where such approach will not only be economically and technologically viable but also provide performance benefits compared to current commercial offerings of connectivity and transit providers.
To ensure the accountability of a cloud environment, security policies may be provided as a set of properties to be enforced by cloud providers. However, due to the sheer size of clouds, it can be challenging to provide timely responses to all the requests coming from cloud users at runtime. In this paper, we design and implement a middleware, PERMON, as a pluggable interface to OpenStack for intercepting and verifying the legitimacy of user requests at runtime, while leveraging our previous work on proactive security verification to improve the efficiency. We describe detailed implementation of the middleware and demonstrate its usefulness through a use case.
As cloud computing becomes increasingly pervasive, it is critical for cloud providers to support basic security controls. Although major cloud providers tout such features, relatively little is known in many cases about their design and implementation. In this paper, we describe several security features in OpenStack, a widely-used, open source cloud computing platform. Our contributions to OpenStack range from key management and storage encryption to guaranteeing the integrity of virtual machine (VM) images prior to boot. We describe the design and implementation of these features in detail and provide a security analysis that enumerates the threats that each mitigates. Our performance evaluation shows that these security features have an acceptable cost-in some cases, within the measurement error observed in an operational cloud deployment. Finally, we highlight lessons learned from our real-world development experiences from contributing these features to OpenStack as a way to encourage others to transition their research into practice.
Cloud computing is a remarkable model for permitting on-demand network access to an elastic collection of configurable adaptive resources and features including storage, software, infrastructure, and platform. However, there are major concerns about security-related issues. A very critical security function is user authentication using passwords. Although many flaws have been discovered in password-based authentication, it remains the most convenient approach that people continue to utilize. Several schemes have been proposed to strengthen its effectiveness such as salted hashes, one-time password (OTP), single-sign-on (SSO) and multi-factor authentication (MFA). This study proposes a new authentication mechanism by combining user's password and modified characters of CAPTCHA to generate a passkey. The modification of the CAPTCHA depends on a secret agreed upon between the cloud provider and the user to employ different characters for some characters in the CAPTCHA. This scheme prevents various attacks including short-password attack, dictionary attack, keylogger, phishing, and social engineering. Moreover, it can resolve the issue of password guessing and the use of a single password for different cloud providers.
Numerous cloud service certifications (CSCs) are emerging in practice. However, in their striving to establish the market standard, CSC initiatives proceed independently, resulting in a disparate collection of CSCs that are predominantly proprietary, based on various standards, and differ in terms of scope, audit process, and underlying certification schemes. Although literature suggests that a certification's design influences its effectiveness, research on CSC design is lacking and there are no commonly agreed structural characteristics of CSCs. Informed by data from 13 expert interviews and 7 cloud computing standards, this paper delineates and structures CSC knowledge by developing a taxonomy for criteria to be assessed in a CSC. The taxonomy consists of 6 dimensions with 28 subordinate characteristics and classifies 328 criteria, thereby building foundations for future research to systematically develop and investigate the efficacy of CSC designs as well as providing a knowledge base for certifiers, cloud providers, and users.