Biblio

Today, beyond a legitimate usage, the numerous advantages of cloud computing are exploited by attackers, and Botnets supporting DDoS attacks are among the greatest beneficiaries of this malicious use. Such a phenomena is a major issue since it strongly increases the power of distributed massive attacks while involving the responsibility of cloud service providers that do not own appropriate solutions. In this paper, we present an original approach that enables a source-based de- tection of UDP-flood DDoS attacks based on a distributed system behavior analysis. Based on a principal component analysis, our contribution consists in: (1) defining the involvement of system metrics in a botcoud's behavior, (2) showing the invariability of the factorial space that defines a botcloud activity and (3) among several legitimate activities, using this factorial space to enable a botcloud detection.

The goal of this letter is to explore the extent to which the vulnerabilities plaguing the Internet, particularly susceptibility to distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, impact the Cloud. DDoS has been known to disrupt Cloud services, but could it do worse by permanently damaging server and switch hardware? Services are hosted in data centers with thousands of servers generating large amounts of heat. Heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) systems prevent server downtime due to overheating. These are remotely managed using network management protocols that are susceptible to network attacks. Recently, Cloud providers have experienced outages due to HVAC malfunctions. Our contributions include a network simulation to study the feasibility of such an attack motivated by our experiences of such a security incident in a real data center. It demonstrates how a network simulator can study the interplay of the communication and thermal properties of a network and help prevent the Cloud provider's worst nightmare: meltdown of the data center as a result of a DDoS attack.

Cloud computing is a distributed architecture that has shared resources, software, and information. There exists a great number of implementations and research for Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) in grid and cloud environments, however they are limited in addressing the requirements for an ideal intrusion detection system. Security issues in Cloud Computing (CC) have become a major concern to its users, availability being one of the key security issues. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) is one of these security issues that poses a great threat to the availability of the cloud services. The aim of this research is to evaluate the performance of IDS in CC when the DDoS attack is detected in a private cloud, named Saa SCloud. A model has been implemented on three virtual machines, Saa SCloud Model, DDoS attack Model, and IDSServer Model. Through this implementation, Service Intrusion Detection System in Cloud Computing (SIDSCC) will be proposed, investigated and evaluated.

Precise fingerprinting of an operating system (OS) is critical to many security and forensics applications in the cloud, such as virtual machine (VM) introspection, penetration testing, guest OS administration, kernel dump analysis, and memory forensics. The existing OS fingerprinting techniques primarily inspect network packets or CPU states, and they all fall short in precision and usability. As the physical memory of a VM always exists in all these applications, in this article, we present OS-SOMMELIER+, a multi-aspect, memory exclusive approach for precise and robust guest OS fingerprinting in the cloud. It works as follows: given a physical memory dump of a guest OS, OS-SOMMELIER+ first uses a code hash based approach from kernel code aspect to determine the guest OS version. If code hash approach fails, OS-SOMMELIER+ then uses a kernel data signature based approach from kernel data aspect to determine the version. We have implemented a prototype system, and tested it with a number of Linux kernels. Our evaluation results show that the code hash approach is faster but can only fingerprint the known kernels, and data signature approach complements the code signature approach and can fingerprint even unknown kernels.

Cloud computing allows users to delegate data and computation to cloud service providers, at the cost of giving up physical control of their computing infrastructure. An attacker (e.g., insider) with physical access to the computing platform can perform various physical attacks, including probing memory buses and cold-boot style attacks. Previous work on secure (co-)processors provides hardware support for memory encryption and prevents direct leakage of sensitive data over the memory bus. However, an adversary snooping on the bus can still infer sensitive information from the memory access traces. Existing work on Oblivious RAM (ORAM) provides a solution for users to put all data in an ORAM; and accesses to an ORAM are obfuscated such that no information leaks through memory access traces. This method, however, incurs significant memory access overhead. This work is the first to leverage programming language techniques to offer efficient memory-trace oblivious program execution, while providing formal security guarantees. We formally define the notion of memory-trace obliviousness, and provide a type system for verifying that a program satisfies this property. We also describe a compiler that transforms a program into a structurally similar one that satisfies memory trace obliviousness. To achieve optimal efficiency, our compiler partitions variables into several small ORAM banks rather than one large one, without risking security. We use several example programs to demonstrate the efficiency gains our compiler achieves in comparison with the naive method of placing all variables in the same ORAM.