A Mitigation System for ARP Cache Poisoning Attacks

Though the telecommunication protocol ARP provides the most prominent service for data transmission in the network by providing the physical layer address for any host's network layer address, its stateless nature remains one of the most well-known opportunities for the attacker community and ultimate threat for the hosts in the network. ARP cache poisoning results in numerous attacks, of which the most noteworthy ones MITM, host impersonation and DoS attacks. This paper presents various recent mitigation methods and proposes a novel mitigation system for ARP cache Poisoning Attacks. The proposed system works as follows: for any ARP Request or Reply messages a time stamp is generated. When it is received or sent by a host, the host will make cross layer inspection and IP-MAC pair matching with ARP table Entry. If ARP table entry matches and cross layer consistency is ensured then ARP reply with Time Stamp is sent. If in both the cases evaluated to be bogus packet, then the IP-MAC pair is added to the untrusted list and further packet inspection is done to ensure no attack has been deployed onto the network. The time is also noted for each entry made into the ARP table which makes ARP stateful. The system is evaluated based on criteria specified by the researchers.