| Title | Side Channels in Deduplication: Trade-offs Between Leakage and Efficiency |
| Publication Type | Conference Paper |
| Year of Publication | 2017 |
| Authors | Armknecht, Frederik, Boyd, Colin, Davies, Gareth T., Gjøsteen, Kristian, Toorani, Mohsen |
| Conference Name | Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security |
| Publisher | ACM |
| Conference Location | New York, NY, USA |
| ISBN Number | 978-1-4503-4944-4 |
| Keywords | cloud storage, composability, Data Sanitization, Deduplication, Human Behavior, human factors, privacy, pubcrawl, resilience, Resiliency, side-channel analysis |
| Abstract | Deduplication removes redundant copies of files or data blocks stored on the cloud. Client-side deduplication, where the client only uploads the file upon the request of the server, provides major storage and bandwidth savings, but introduces a number of security concerns. Harnik et al. (2010) showed how cross-user client-side deduplication inherently gives the adversary access to a (noisy) side-channel that may divulge whether or not a particular file is stored on the server, leading to leakage of user information. We provide formal definitions for deduplication strategies and their security in terms of adversarial advantage. Using these definitions, we provide a criterion for designing good strategies and then prove a bound characterizing the necessary trade-off between security and efficiency. |
| URL | http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3052973.3053019 |
| DOI | 10.1145/3052973.3053019 |
| Citation Key | armknecht_side_2017 |
Side Channels in Deduplication: Trade-offs Between Leakage and Efficiency