Visible to the public SRVB cryptosystem: another attempt to revive Knapsack-based public-key encryption schemes

TitleSRVB cryptosystem: another attempt to revive Knapsack-based public-key encryption schemes
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2020
AuthorsBoas, Y. d S. V., Rocha, D. S., Barros, C. E. de, Martina, J. E.
Conference Name2020 27th International Conference on Telecommunications (ICT)
Date Publishedoct
Keywordsalgorithmic simplicity, approximation theory, Asymmetric Encryption, Communications technology, composability, consistent security improvements, cryptography, Diophantine Approximation, Diophantine approximations based attacks, Encryption, Human Behavior, Knapsack Problem, knapsack problems, knapsack schemes, knapsack-based asymmetric encryption schemes, knapsack-based cryptography, knapsack-based encryption schemes, Knapsack-based public-key encryption schemes, Lattice Oracle, lattice problems oracle attacks, Lattices, mathematical simplicity, Merkle-Hellman Cryptosystem, Metrics, modern telecommunication technology, pubcrawl, public key cryptography, public-key cryptography, public-key cryptosystem, Resiliency, Shamir Cryptanalysis, SRVB cryptosystem, Subset Sum Problem, ubiquitous building block
AbstractPublic-key cryptography is a ubiquitous buildingblock of modern telecommunication technology. Among the most historically important, the knapsack-based encryption schemes, from the early years of public-key cryptography, performed particularly well in computational resources (time and memory), and mathematical and algorithmic simplicity. Although effective cryptanalyses readily curtailed their widespread adoption to several different attempts, the possibility of actual usage of knapsack-based asymmetric encryption schemes remains unsettled. This paper aims to present a novel construction that offers consistent security improvements on knapsack-based cryptography. We propose two improvements upon the original knapsack cryptosystem that address the most important types of attacks: the Diophantine approximationsbased attacks and the lattice problems oracle attacks. The proposed defences demonstrably preclude the types of attacks mentioned above, thus contributing to revive knapsack schemes or settle the matter negatively. Finally, we present the http://t3infosecurity.com/nepsecNep.Sec, a contest that is offering a prize for breaking our proposed cryptosystem.
DOI10.1109/ICT49546.2020.9239493
Citation Keyboas_srvb_2020