CT-T

The goal of this project is to design, implement, and test an internetwork architecture called the Accountable Internet Protocol (AIP). AIP retains much of the elegance and simplicity of IP, but is far better equipped to thwart malicious adversaries. To provide this protection, AIP incorporates three kinds of accountability: source accountability, control-plane accountability, and dataplane accountability. Together, these three forms of accountability ensure that any host, router, and autonomous network can identify misbehaving components.

Trust in a system can be compromised in many places. Extensive research has been conducted on the development of trustworthy requirements and policies, but those requirements and policies are effective only if they are carried out correctly. Ensuring the absence of implementation flaws by testing is inadequate; testing cannot be exhaustive and thus can miss critical vulnerabilities. Formal verification proof that the system correctly implements its specification and enforces its policies is an attractive alternative.

In this proposal we consider the question of what constitutes identities in cryptography. Typical examples of identities include your name and your social-security number, or your fingerprint/iris-scan, or your address, or your (non-revoked) Public-Key coming from some trusted public-key infrastructure. In many situations, however, where you are defines your identity. For example, we know the role of a bank-teller behind a bullet-proof bank window not because he or she shows us her credentials but by merely knowing her location.