Cyber-physical systems (CPS) have become increasingly prevalent in appli- cations including health care, energy, and transportation. The tight coupling between cyber and physical components of CPS implies that cyber attacks can degrade the safety, availability, and performance of physical components. The cyber components also introduce multiple entry points to the CPS, lowering the cost of attacks compared to purely physical systems.
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) have become increasingly prevalent in applications including health care, energy, and transportation. The tight coupling between cyber and physical components of CPS implies that cyber attacks can degrade the safety, availability, and performance of physical components. The cyber components also introduce multiple entry points to the CPS, lowering the cost of attacks compared to purely physical systems.
The electric power CPS faces an alarmingly high risk of catastrophic damage from cyber--attacks. However, modeling cyber--attacks, evaluating consequences, and developing appropriate countermeasures require a detailed, realistic, and tractable model of electric power CPS operations. The primary barrier is the lack of access to models for the complex legacy proprietary systems that the electric power grid has relied on for decades.
Cyber--physical systems (CPS) have become increasingly prevalent in applications including health care, energy, and transportation. The tight coupling between cyber and physical components of CPS implies that cyber--attacks can degrade the safety, availability, and performance of physical components. The cyber components also introduce multiple entry points to the CPS, lowering the cost of attacks compared to purely physical systems.
