Biblio

Transitioning to more open architectures has been making Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) vulnerable to malicious attacks that are beyond the conventional cyber attacks. This paper studies attack-resilience enhancement for a system under emerging attacks in the environment of the controller. An effective way to address this problem is to make system state estimation accurate enough for control regardless of the compromised components. This work follows this way and develops a procedure named CPS checkpointing and recovery, which leverages historical data to recover failed system states. Specially, we first propose a new concept of physical-state recovery. The essential operation is defined as rolling the system forward starting from a consistent historical system state. Second, we design a checkpointing protocol that defines how to record system states for the recovery. The protocol introduces a sliding window that accommodates attack-detection delay to improve the correctness of stored states. Third, we present a use case of CPS checkpointing and recovery that deals with compromised sensor measurements. At last, we evaluate our design through conducting simulator-based experiments and illustrating the use of our design with an unmanned vehicle case study.