Biblio

Filters: Author is Lagraa, S.  [Clear All Filters]
2020-12-17
Amrouche, F., Lagraa, S., Frank, R., State, R..  2020.  Intrusion detection on robot cameras using spatio-temporal autoencoders: A self-driving car application. 2020 IEEE 91st Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC2020-Spring). :1—5.

Robot Operating System (ROS) is becoming more and more important and is used widely by developers and researchers in various domains. One of the most important fields where it is being used is the self-driving cars industry. However, this framework is far from being totally secure, and the existing security breaches do not have robust solutions. In this paper we focus on the camera vulnerabilities, as it is often the most important source for the environment discovery and the decision-making process. We propose an unsupervised anomaly detection tool for detecting suspicious frames incoming from camera flows. Our solution is based on spatio-temporal autoencoders used to truthfully reconstruct the camera frames and detect abnormal ones by measuring the difference with the input. We test our approach on a real-word dataset, i.e. flows coming from embedded cameras of self-driving cars. Our solution outperforms the existing works on different scenarios.

Lagraa, S., Cailac, M., Rivera, S., Beck, F., State, R..  2019.  Real-Time Attack Detection on Robot Cameras: A Self-Driving Car Application. 2019 Third IEEE International Conference on Robotic Computing (IRC). :102—109.

The Robot Operating System (ROS) are being deployed for multiple life critical activities such as self-driving cars, drones, and industries. However, the security has been persistently neglected, especially the image flows incoming from camera robots. In this paper, we perform a structured security assessment of robot cameras using ROS. We points out a relevant number of security flaws that can be used to take over the flows incoming from the robot cameras. Furthermore, we propose an intrusion detection system to detect abnormal flows. Our defense approach is based on images comparisons and unsupervised anomaly detection method. We experiment our approach on robot cameras embedded on a self-driving car.

Rivera, S., Lagraa, S., State, R..  2019.  ROSploit: Cybersecurity Tool for ROS. 2019 Third IEEE International Conference on Robotic Computing (IRC). :415—416.

Robotic Operating System(ROS) security research is currently in a preliminary state, with limited research in tools or models. Considering the trend of digitization of robotic systems, this lack of foundational knowledge increases the potential threat posed by security vulnerabilities in ROS. In this article, we present a new tool to assist further security research in ROS, ROSploit. ROSploit is a modular two-pronged offensive tool covering both reconnaissance and exploitation of ROS systems, designed to assist researchers in testing exploits for ROS.

2019-08-05
Kaiafas, G., Varisteas, G., Lagraa, S., State, R., Nguyen, C. D., Ries, T., Ourdane, M..  2018.  Detecting Malicious Authentication Events Trustfully. NOMS 2018 - 2018 IEEE/IFIP Network Operations and Management Symposium. :1-6.

Anomaly detection on security logs is receiving more and more attention. Authentication events are an important component of security logs, and being able to produce trustful and accurate predictions minimizes the effort of cyber-experts to stop false attacks. Observed events are classified into Normal, for legitimate user behavior, and Malicious, for malevolent actions. These classes are consistently excessively imbalanced which makes the classification problem harder; in the commonly used Los Alamos dataset, the malicious class comprises only 0.00033% of the total. This work proposes a novel method to extract advanced composite features, and a supervised learning technique for classifying authentication logs trustfully; the models are Random Forest, LogitBoost, Logistic Regression, and ultimately Majority Voting which leverages the predictions of the previous models and gives the final prediction for each authentication event. We measure the performance of our experiments by using the False Negative Rate and False Positive Rate. In overall we achieve 0 False Negative Rate (i.e. no attack was missed), and on average a False Positive Rate of 0.0019.