Biblio

Filters: Author is Mathur, Aditya  [Clear All Filters]
2018-09-28
Umer, Muhammad Azmi, Mathur, Aditya, Junejo, Khurum Nazir, Adepu, Sridhar.  2017.  Integrating Design and Data Centric Approaches to Generate Invariants for Distributed Attack Detection. Proceedings of the 2017 Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security and PrivaCy. :131–136.
Process anomaly is used for detecting cyber-physical attacks on critical infrastructure such as plants for water treatment and electric power generation. Identification of process anomaly is possible using rules that govern the physical and chemical behavior of the process within a plant. These rules, often referred to as invariants, can be derived either directly from plant design or from the data generated in an operational. However, for operational legacy plants, one might consider a data-centric approach for the derivation of invariants. The study reported here is a comparison of design-centric and data-centric approaches to derive process invariants. The study was conducted using the design of, and the data generated from, an operational water treatment plant. The outcome of the study supports the conjecture that neither approach is adequate in itself, and hence, the two ought to be integrated.
2017-05-17
Adepu, Sridhar, Mathur, Aditya.  2016.  Distributed Detection of Single-Stage Multipoint Cyber Attacks in a Water Treatment Plant. Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security. :449–460.

A distributed detection method is proposed to detect single stage multi-point (SSMP) attacks on a Cyber Physical System (CPS). Such attacks aim at compromising two or more sensors or actuators at any one stage of a CPS and could totally compromise a controller and prevent it from detecting the attack. However, as demonstrated in this work, using the flow properties of water from one stage to the other, a neighboring controller was found effective in detecting such attacks. The method is based on physical invariants derived for each stage of the CPS from its design. The attack detection effectiveness of the method was evaluated experimentally against an operational water treatment testbed containing 42 sensors and actuators. Results from the experiments point to high effectiveness of the method in detecting a variety of SSMP attacks but also point to its limitations. Distributing the attack detection code among various controllers adds to the scalability of the proposed method.