Biblio
Information and Communications Technology (ICT) supply chain risk management (SCRM) is the process of identifying and mitigating risks in the manufacture and distribution of ICT products and services. While the Information Technology (IT) sector and the Communications sector face different supply chain risks, their mitigation strategies are similar. Both sectors emphasize having an end-to-end Cyber-SCRM program, continuously evaluating risks to vendor networks, and maintaining geographically-diverse and occasionally-redundant supply chains in the event of a manufacturer compromise.
This paper argues that the security management of the robot supply chain would preferably focus on Sino-US relations and technical bottlenecks based on a comprehensive security analysis through open-source intelligence and data mining of associated discourses. Through the lens of the newsboy model and game theory, this study reconstructs the risk appraisal model of the robot supply chain and rebalances the process of the Sino-US competition game, leading to the prediction of China's strategic movements under the supply risks. Ultimately, this paper offers a threefold suggestion: increasing the overall revenue through cost control and scaled expansion, resilience enhancement and risk prevention, and outreach of a third party's cooperation for confrontation capabilities reinforcement.
This short paper argues that current conceptions in trust formation scholarship miss the context of zero trust, a practice growing in importance in cyber security. The contribution of this paper presents a novel approach to help conceptualize and operationalize zero trust and a call for a research agenda. Further work will expand this model and explore the implications of zero trust in future digital systems.
The exploitation of key supply chains by foreign adversaries—especially when executed in concert with cyber intrusions and insider threat activities—represents a complex and growing threat to strategically important U.S. economic sectors and critical infrastructure. The increasing reliance on foreign-owned or controlled hardware, software, or services as well as the proliferation of networking technologies, including those associated with the Internet of Things, creates vulnerabilities in our nation’s supply chains. By exploiting these vulnerabilities, foreign adversaries could compromise the integrity, trustworthiness, and authenticity of products and services that underpin government and American industry, or even subvert and disrupt critical networks and systems, operations, products, and weapons platforms in a time of crisis. We must elevate the role of supply chain security in the acquisition process.
A critical need exists for collaboration and action by government, industry, and academia to address cyber weaknesses or vulnerabilities inherent to embedded or cyber physical systems (CPS). These vulnerabilities are introduced as we leverage technologies, methods, products, and services from the global supply chain throughout a system's lifecycle. As adversaries are exploiting these weaknesses as access points for malicious purposes, solutions for system security and resilience become a priority call for action. The SAE G-32 Cyber Physical Systems Security Committee has been convened to address this complex challenge. The SAE G-32 will take a holistic systems engineering approach to integrate system security considerations to develop a Cyber Physical System Security Framework. This framework is intended to bring together multiple industries and develop a method and common language which will enable us to more effectively, efficiently, and consistently communicate a risk, cost, and performance trade space. The standard will allow System Integrators to make decisions utilizing a common framework and language to develop affordable, trustworthy, resilient, and secure systems.
Throughout the life cycle of any technical project, the enterprise needs to assess the risks associated with its development, commissioning, operation and decommissioning. This article defines the task of researching risks in relation to the operation of a data storage subsystem in the cloud infrastructure of a geographically distributed company and the tools that are required for this. Analysts point out that, compared to 2018, in 2019 there were 3.5 times more cases of confidential information leaks from storages on unprotected (freely accessible due to incorrect configuration) servers in cloud services. The total number of compromised personal data and payment information records increased 5.4 times compared to 2018 and amounted to more than 8.35 billion records. Moreover, the share of leaks of payment information has decreased, but the percentage of leaks of personal data has grown and accounts for almost 90% of all leaks from cloud storage. On average, each unsecured service identified resulted in 33.7 million personal data records being leaked. Leaks are mainly related to misconfiguration of services and stored resources, as well as human factors. These impacts can be minimized by improving the skills of cloud storage administrators and regularly auditing storage. Despite its seeming insecurity, the cloud is a reliable way of storing data. At the same time, leaks are still occurring. According to Kaspersky Lab, every tenth (11%) data leak from the cloud became possible due to the actions of the provider, while a third of all cyber incidents in the cloud (31% in Russia and 33% in the world) were due to gullibility company employees caught up in social engineering techniques. Minimizing the risks associated with the storage of personal data is one of the main tasks when operating a company's cloud infrastructure.
The article deals with the development and implementation of a method for synthesizing structures of threats and risks to information security based on a fuzzy approach. We consider a method for modeling threat structures based on structural abstractions: aggregation, generalization, and Association. It is shown that the considered forms of structural abstractions allow implementing the processes of Ascending and Descending inheritance. characteristics of the threats. A database of fuzzy rules based on procedural abstractions has been developed and implemented in the fuzzy logic tool environment Fussy Logic.
The supply chains for advanced automobiles will continue to become increasingly complex. Furthermore, automotive OEMs will experience decreased control over the components and software implemented into their vehicles. These issues create risks to advanced vehicle technologies that must be addressed by a comprehensive and coordinated approach to end-to-end cybersecurity across the automotive supply chain.
This paper presents an access control modelling that integrates risk assessment elements in the attribute-based model to organize the identification, authentication and authorization rules. Access control is complex in integrated systems, which have different actors accessing different information in multiple levels. In addition, systems are composed by different components, much of them from different developers. This requires a complete supply chain trust to protect the many existent actors, their privacy and the entire ecosystem. The incorporation of the risk assessment element introduces additional variables like the current environment of the subjects and objects, time of the day and other variables to help produce more efficient and effective decisions in terms of granting access to specific objects. The risk-based attributed access control modelling was applied in a health platform, Project CityZen.
The proliferation of IoT devices in smart homes, hospitals, and enterprise networks is wide-spread and continuing to increase in a superlinear manner. The question is: how can one assess the security of an IoT network in a holistic manner? In this paper, we have explored two dimensions of security assessment- using vulnerability information and attack vectors of IoT devices and their underlying components (compositional security scores) and using SIEM logs captured from the communications and operations of such devices in a network (dynamic activity metrics). These measures are used to evaluate the security of IoT devices and the overall IoT network, demonstrating the effectiveness of attack circuits as practical tools for computing security metrics (exploitability, impact, and risk to confidentiality, integrity, and availability) of the network. We decided to approach threat modeling using attack graphs. To that end, we propose the notion of attack circuits, which are generated from input/output pairs constructed from CVEs using NLP, and an attack graph composed of these circuits. Our system provides insight into possible attack paths an adversary may utilize based on their exploitability, impact, or overall risk. We have performed experiments on IoT networks to demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed techniques.
Another risk posed by the limited number of available vendors is the threat of supply chain attacks. According to researchers at CrowdStrike on June 27, 2017 the destructive malware known as NotPetya was deployed using a legitimate software package employed by organizations operating in Ukraine. The attack used an update mechanism built into the software to provide updates and distribute them to the vendor’s customers. This same mechanism had been used a month earlier to deploy other ransomware attacks. Supply chain attacks exploit a trust relationship between software or hardware vendors and their customers. These attacks can be widespread targeting the entire trusted vendor’s customer base and are growing in frequency as well as sophistication.