Biblio

This paper presents an interface that allows a human user to specify a desired path for a mobile robot in a planar workspace with noisy binary inputs that are obtained at low bit-rates through an electroencephalograph (EEG). We represent desired paths as geodesics with respect to a cost function that is defined so that each path-homotopy class contains exactly one (local) geodesic. We apply max-margin structured learning to recover a cost function that is consistent with observations of human walking paths. We derive an optimal feedback communication protocol to select a local geodesic— equivalently, a path-homotopy class—using a sequence of noisy bits. We validate our approach with experiments that quantify both how well our learned cost function characterizes human walking data and how well human subjects perform with the resulting interface in navigating a simulated robot with EEG.

Trusting a computer for a security-sensitive task (such as checking email or banking online) requires the user to know something about the computer's state. We examine research on securely capturing a computer's state, and consider the utility of this information both for improving security on the local computer (e.g., to convince the user that her computer is not infected with malware) and for communicating a remote computer's state (e.g., to enable the user to check that a web server will adequately protect her data). Although the recent "Trusted Computing" initiative has drawn both positive and negative attention to this area, we consider the older and broader topic of bootstrapping trust in a computer. We cover issues ranging from the wide collection of secure hardware that can serve as a foundation for trust, to the usability issues that arise when trying to convey computer state information to humans. This approach unifies disparate research efforts and highlights opportunities for additional work that can guide real-world improvements in computer security.

BootJacker is a proof-of-concept attack tool which demonstrates that authentication mechanisms employed by an operating system can be bypassed by obtaining physical access and simply forcing a restart. The key insight that enables this attack is that the contents of memory on some machines are fully preserved across a warm boot. Upon a reboot, BootJacker uses this residual memory state to revive the original host operating system environment and run malicious payloads. Using BootJacker, an attacker can break into a locked user session and gain access to open encrypted disks, web browser sessions or other secure network connections. BootJacker's non-persistent design makes it possible for an attacker to leave no traces on the victim machine.