Minimum Cost Security Measurements for Attack Tree Based Threat Models in Smart Grid
Title | Minimum Cost Security Measurements for Attack Tree Based Threat Models in Smart Grid |
Publication Type | Conference Paper |
Year of Publication | 2017 |
Authors | Chakraborty, N., Kalaimannan, E. |
Conference Name | 2017 IEEE 8th Annual Ubiquitous Computing, Electronics and Mobile Communication Conference (UEMCON) |
ISBN Number | 978-1-5386-1104-3 |
Keywords | attack tree, cost optimization, energy theft, Human Behavior, human factors, Meters, Metrics, privacy, pubcrawl, Real-time Systems, Resiliency, Scalability, security, smart grid security, Smart grids, smart meters, Tools, Ubiquitous Computing Security |
Abstract | In this paper, we focus on the security issues and challenges in smart grid. Smart grid security features must address not only the expected deliberate attacks, but also inadvertent compromises of the information infrastructure due to user errors, equipment failures, and natural disasters. An important component of smart grid is the advanced metering infrastructure which is critical to support two-way communication of real time information for better electricity generation, distribution and consumption. These reasons makes security a prominent factor of importance to AMI. In recent times, attacks on smart grid have been modelled using attack tree. Attack tree has been extensively used as an efficient and effective tool to model security threats and vulnerabilities in systems where the ultimate goal of an attacker can be divided into a set of multiple concrete or atomic sub-goals. The sub-goals are related to each other as either AND-siblings or OR-siblings, which essentially depicts whether some or all of the sub-goals must be attained for the attacker to reach the goal. On the other hand, as a security professional one needs to find out the most effective way to address the security issues in the system under consideration. It is imperative to assume that each attack prevention strategy incurs some cost and the utility company would always look to minimize the same. We present a cost-effective mechanism to identify minimum number of potential atomic attacks in an attack tree. |
URL | http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8249049/ |
DOI | 10.1109/UEMCON.2017.8249049 |
Citation Key | chakraborty_minimum_2017 |