Visible to the public A Subliminal Channel in EdDSA: Information Leakage with High-Speed Signatures

TitleA Subliminal Channel in EdDSA: Information Leakage with High-Speed Signatures
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2017
AuthorsHartl, Alexander, Annessi, Robert, Zseby, Tanja
Conference NameProceedings of the 2017 International Workshop on Managing Insider Security Threats
PublisherACM
Conference LocationNew York, NY, USA
ISBN Number978-1-4503-5177-5
Keywordscensorship circumvention, Cyber-physical systems, Data Exfiltration, digital signatures, ed25519, eddsa, Information hiding, information leakage, network protocols, Network security, pubcrawl, resilience, Scalability, subliminal channels
AbstractSubliminal channels in digital signatures provide a very effective method to clandestinely leak information from inside a system to a third party outside. Information can be hidden in signature parameters in a way that both network operators and legitimate receivers would not notice any suspicious traces. Subliminal channels have previously been discovered in other signatures, such as ElGamal and ECDSA. Those signatures are usually just sparsely exchanged in network protocols, e.g. during authentication, and their usability for leaking information is therefore limited. With the advent of high-speed signatures such as EdDSA, however, scenarios become feasible where numerous packets with individual signatures are transferred between communicating parties. This significantly increases the bandwidth for transmitting subliminal information. Examples are broadcast clock synchronization or signed sensor data export. A subliminal channel in signatures appended to numerous packets allows the transmission of a high amount of hidden information, suitable for large scale data exfiltration or even the operation of command and control structures. In this paper, we show the existence of a broadband subliminal channel in the EdDSA signature scheme. We then discuss the implications of the subliminal channel in practice using thee different scenarios: broadcast clock synchronization, signed sensor data export, and classic TLS. We perform several experiments to show the use of the subliminal channel and measure the actual bandwidth of the subliminal information that can be leaked. We then discuss the applicability of different countermeasures against subliminal channels from other signature schemes to EdDSA but conclude that none of the existing solutions can sufficiently protect against data exfiltration in network protocols secured by EdDSA.
URLhttp://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3139923.3139925
DOI10.1145/3139923.3139925
Citation Keyhartl_subliminal_2017