Visible to the public RockFS: Cloud-Backed File System Resilience to Client-Side Attacks

TitleRockFS: Cloud-Backed File System Resilience to Client-Side Attacks
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2018
AuthorsMatos, David R., Pardal, Miguel L., Carle, Georg, Correia, Miguel
Conference NameProceedings of the 19th International Middleware Conference
PublisherACM
Conference LocationNew York, NY, USA
ISBN Number978-1-4503-5702-9
Keywordscloud, cloud computing, File systems, Intrusion Recovery, Metrics, privacy, pubcrawl, resilience, Resiliency, Scalability, Secure File Sharing, System recovery, user privacy, user privacy in the cloud
Abstract

Cloud-backed file systems provide on-demand, high-availability, scalable storage. Their security may be improved with techniques such as erasure codes and secret sharing to fragment files and encryption keys in several clouds. Attacking the server-side of such systems involves penetrating one or more clouds, which can be extremely difficult. Despite all these benefits, a weak side remains: the client-side. The client devices store user credentials that, if stolen or compromised, may lead to confidentiality, integrity, and availability violations. In this paper we propose RockFS, a cloud-backed file system framework that aims to make the client-side of such systems resilient to attacks. RockFS protects data in the client device and allows undoing unintended file modifications.

URLhttps://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3274808.3274817
DOI10.1145/3274808.3274817
Citation KeymatosRockFSCloudbackedFile2018