RockFS: Cloud-Backed File System Resilience to Client-Side Attacks
Title | RockFS: Cloud-Backed File System Resilience to Client-Side Attacks |
Publication Type | Conference Paper |
Year of Publication | 2018 |
Authors | Matos, David R., Pardal, Miguel L., Carle, Georg, Correia, Miguel |
Conference Name | Proceedings of the 19th International Middleware Conference |
Publisher | ACM |
Conference Location | New York, NY, USA |
ISBN Number | 978-1-4503-5702-9 |
Keywords | cloud, cloud computing, File systems, Intrusion Recovery, Metrics, privacy, pubcrawl, resilience, Resiliency, Scalability, Secure File Sharing, System recovery, user privacy, user privacy in the cloud |
Abstract | Cloud-backed file systems provide on-demand, high-availability, scalable storage. Their security may be improved with techniques such as erasure codes and secret sharing to fragment files and encryption keys in several clouds. Attacking the server-side of such systems involves penetrating one or more clouds, which can be extremely difficult. Despite all these benefits, a weak side remains: the client-side. The client devices store user credentials that, if stolen or compromised, may lead to confidentiality, integrity, and availability violations. In this paper we propose RockFS, a cloud-backed file system framework that aims to make the client-side of such systems resilient to attacks. RockFS protects data in the client device and allows undoing unintended file modifications. |
URL | https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3274808.3274817 |
DOI | 10.1145/3274808.3274817 |
Citation Key | matosRockFSCloudbackedFile2018 |