Visible to the public Methodology to Estimate Attack Graph System State from a Simulation of a Nuclear Research Reactor

TitleMethodology to Estimate Attack Graph System State from a Simulation of a Nuclear Research Reactor
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2018
AuthorsNichols, W., Hawrylak, P. J., Hale, J., Papa, M.
Conference Name2018 Resilience Week (RWS)
Date Publishedaug
Keywordsattack graph, attack graph system state, Attack Graphs, composability, cyber-physical system, Cyber-physical systems, cybersecurity, Databases, formal verification, graph theory, hybrid attack graph, Inductors, Metrics, nuclear engineering computing, nuclear research reactor, Predictive models, pubcrawl, resilience, Resiliency, safety-critical applications, safety-critical software, SCADA System Security, security of data, security testing, state estimation, Temperature sensors, Tools, verification procedure, Vulnerability Evaluation
AbstractHybrid attack graphs are a powerful tool when analyzing the cybersecurity of a cyber-physical system. However, it is important to ensure that this tool correctly models reality, particularly when modelling safety-critical applications, such as a nuclear reactor. By automatically verifying that a simulation reaches the state predicted by an attack graph by analyzing the final state of the simulation, this verification procedure can be accomplished. As such, a mechanism to estimate if a simulation reaches the expected state in a hybrid attack graph is proposed here for the nuclear reactor domain.
DOI10.1109/RWEEK.2018.8473465
Citation Keynichols_methodology_2018