Visible to the public Betweenness Centrality and Cache Privacy in Information-Centric Networks

TitleBetweenness Centrality and Cache Privacy in Information-Centric Networks
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2018
AuthorsAbani, Noor, Braun, Torsten, Gerla, Mario
Conference NameProceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Information-Centric Networking
PublisherACM
Conference LocationNew York, NY, USA
ISBN Number978-1-4503-5959-7
Keywordsanonymity, anonymity set, betweenness centrality, cache privacy, caching, ICN, information-centric networking, Metrics, Named-Data Networking, NDN, pubcrawl, resilience, Resiliency, Router Systems Security, timing attacks
Abstract

In-network caching is a feature shared by all proposed Information Centric Networking (ICN) architectures as it is critical to achieving a more efficient retrieval of content. However, the default "cache everything everywhere" universal caching scheme has caused the emergence of several privacy threats. Timing attacks are one such privacy breach where attackers can probe caches and use timing analysis of data retrievals to identify if content was retrieved from the data source or from the cache, the latter case inferring that this content was requested recently. We have previously proposed a betweenness centrality based caching strategy to mitigate such attacks by increasing user anonymity. We demonstrated its efficacy in a transit-stub topology. In this paper, we further investigate the effect of betweenness centrality based caching on cache privacy and user anonymity in more general synthetic and real world Internet topologies. It was also shown that an attacker with access to multiple compromised routers can locate and track a mobile user by carrying out multiple timing analysis attacks from various parts of the network. We extend our privacy evaluation to a scenario with mobile users and show that a betweenness centrality based caching policy provides a mobile user with path privacy by increasing an attacker's difficulty in locating a moving user or identifying his/her route.

URLhttps://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=3267955.3267964
DOI10.1145/3267955.3267964
Citation Keyabani_betweenness_2018