| Title | Deterring Strategic Cyberattack |
| Publication Type | Journal Article |
| Year of Publication | 2011 |
| Authors | Elliott, David |
| Journal | IEEE Security Privacy |
| Volume | 9 |
| Pagination | 36–40 |
| ISSN | 1558-4046 |
| Keywords | collateral damage control, comprehensive defense, Computer crime, critical infrastructure protection, critical infrastructures, cyber security, cyber-dependent infrastructure, cyberattack, cyberattack deterrence, Cyberspace, cyberwar, deterrence, government policies, Human Behavior, international agreement, legal norm, nuclear deterrence, nuclear deterrence versus cyber deterrence, nuclear regime, privacy, pubcrawl, resilience, Scalability, security of data |
| Abstract | Protecting critical infrastructure from cyberattacks by other nations is a matter of considerable concern. Can deterrence play a role in such protection? Can lessons from nuclear deterrence-the most elaborated and successful version of deterrence-be adapted to the cyber case? Currently, little overlap exists between the two, although that might change in the aftermath of an extensive, destructive cyberattack. The most effective way to protect the cyber-dependent infrastructure is a comprehensive defense (deterrence by denial), which was impractical in the nuclear regime. However, this approach presents challenges. Existing legal norms, particularly those related to controlling collateral damage, might provide some deterrence. Another option might be a new international agreement, but that would involve several difficult issues. |
| DOI | 10.1109/MSP.2011.24 |
| Citation Key | elliott_deterring_2011 |
Deterring Strategic Cyberattack