| Title | A Stealthy Hardware Trojan Design and Corresponding Detection Method |
| Publication Type | Conference Paper |
| Year of Publication | 2021 |
| Authors | Su, Yu, Shen, Haihua, Lu, Renjie, Ye, Yunying |
| Conference Name | 2021 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS) |
| Keywords | Benchmark testing, composability, Controllability, Hardware, hardware security, Hardware Trojans, imbalanced controllability, Integrated circuit modeling, Observability, pubcrawl, resilience, Resiliency, Systematics, transition probability, trojan horse detection, Trojan horses, unsupervised clustering |
| Abstract | For the purpose of stealthiness, trigger-based Hardware Trojans(HTs) tend to have at least one trigger signal with an extremely low transition probability to evade the functional verification. In this paper, we discuss the correlation between poor testability and low transition probability, and then propose a kind of systematic Trojan trigger model with extremely low transition probability but reasonable testability, which can disable the Controllability and Observability for hardware Trojan Detection (COTD) technique, an efficient HT detection method based on circuits testability. Based on experiments and tests on circuits, we propose that the more imbalanced 0/1-controllability can indicate the lower transition probability. And a trigger signal identification method using the imbalanced 0/1-controllability is proposed. Experiments on ISCAS benchmarks show that the proposed method can obtain a 100% true positive rate and average 5.67% false positive rate for the trigger signal. |
| DOI | 10.1109/ISCAS51556.2021.9401770 |
| Citation Key | su_stealthy_2021 |
A Stealthy Hardware Trojan Design and Corresponding Detection Method