Biblio
In-vehicle CAN (Controller Area Network) bus network does not have any network security protection measures, which is facing a serious network security threat. However, most of the intrusion detection solutions requiring extensive computational resources cannot be implemented in in- vehicle network system because of the resource constrained ECUs. To add additional hardware or to utilize cloud computing, we need to solve the cost problem and the reliable communication requirement between vehicles and cloud platform, which is difficult to be applied in a short time. Therefore, we need to propose a short-term solution for automobile manufacturers. In this paper, we propose a signature-based light-weight intrusion detection system, which can be applied directly and promptly to vehicle's ECUs (Electronic Control Units). We detect the anomalies caused by several attack modes on CAN bus from real-world scenarios, which provide the basis for selecting signatures. Experimental results show that our method can effectively detect CAN traffic related anomalies. For the content related anomalies, the detection ratio can be improved by exploiting the relationship between the signals.
Due to the critical importance of Industrial Control Systems (ICS) to the operations of cities and countries, research into the security of critical infrastructure has become increasingly relevant and necessary. As a component of both the research and application sides of smart city development, accurate and precise modeling, simulation, and verification are key parts of a robust design and development tools that provide critical assistance in the prevention, detection, and recovery from abnormal behavior in the sensors, controllers, and actuators which make up a modern ICS system. However, while these tools have potential, there is currently a need for helper-tools to assist with their setup and configuration, if they are to be utilized widely. Existing state-of-the-art tools are often technically complex and difficult to customize for any given IoT/ICS processes. This is a serious barrier to entry for most technicians, engineers, researchers, and smart city planners, while slowing down the critical aspects of safety and security verification. To remedy this issue, we take a case study of existing simulation toolkits within the field of water management and expand on existing tools and algorithms with simplistic automated retrieval functionality using a much more in-depth and usable customization interface to accelerate simulation scenario design and implementation, allowing for customization of the cyber-physical network infrastructure and cyber attack scenarios. We additionally provide a novel in-tool-assessment of network’s resilience according to graph theory path diversity. Further, we lay out a roadmap for future development and application of the proposed tool, including expansions on resiliency and potential vulnerability model checking, and discuss applications of our work to other fields relevant to the design and operation of smart cities.
Physical Unclonable Function is an innovative hardware security primitives that exploit the physical characteristics of a physical object to generate a unique identifier, which play the role of the object's fingerprint. Silicon PUF, a popular type of PUFs, exploits the variation in the manufacturing process of integrated circuits (ICs). It needs an input called challenge to generate the response as an output. In addition, of classical attacks, PUFs are vulnerable to physical and modeling attacks. The performance of the PUFs is measured by several metrics like reliability, uniqueness and uniformity. So as an evidence, the main goal is to provide a complete tool that checks the strength and quantifies the performance of a given physical unconscionable function. This paper provides a tool and develops a set of metrics that can achieve safely the proposed goal.
This paper examines multiple machine learning models to find the model that best indicates anomalous activity in an industrial control system that is under a software-based attack. The researched machine learning models are Random Forest, Gradient Boosting Machine, Artificial Neural Network, and Recurrent Neural Network classifiers built-in Python and tested against the HIL-based Augmented ICS dataset. Although the results showed that Random Forest, Gradient Boosting Machine, Artificial Neural Network, and Long Short-Term Memory classification models have great potential for anomaly detection in industrial control systems, we found that Random Forest with tuned hyperparameters slightly outperformed the other models.