"Side channel power analysis of an AES-256 bootloader"
Title | "Side channel power analysis of an AES-256 bootloader" |
Publication Type | Conference Paper |
Year of Publication | 2015 |
Authors | C. O'Flynn, Z. David Chen |
Conference Name | 2015 IEEE 28th Canadian Conference on Electrical and Computer Engineering (CCECE) |
Date Published | May |
Publisher | IEEE |
ISBN Number | 978-1-4799-5829-0 |
Accession Number | 15239720 |
Keywords | AES-256 bootloader, AES-256-CBC, Correlation, correlation power analysis, CPA attack, cryptographic algorithms, cryptography, Encryption, Entropy, firmware files, Hamming weight, initialization vector, microcontrollers, Power measurement, power measurements, pubcrawl170102, SCA, secure bootloader, side channel attacks, side channel power analysis, Synchronization |
Abstract | Side Channel Attacks (SCA) using power measurements are a known method of breaking cryptographic algorithms such as AES. Published research into attacks on AES frequently target only AES-128, and often target only the core Electronic Code-Book (ECB) algorithm, without discussing surrounding issues such as triggering, along with breaking the initialization vector. This paper demonstrates a complete attack on a secure bootloader, where the firmware files have been encrypted with AES-256-CBC. A classic Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) attack is performed on AES-256 to recover the complete 32-byte key, and a CPA attack is also used to attempt recovery of the initialization vector (IV). |
URL | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7129369 |
DOI | 10.1109/CCECE.2015.7129369 |
Citation Key | 7129369 |
- Hamming weight
- Synchronization
- side channel power analysis
- side channel attacks
- secure bootloader
- SCA
- pubcrawl170102
- power measurements
- Power measurement
- microcontrollers
- initialization vector
- AES-256 bootloader
- firmware files
- Entropy
- encryption
- Cryptography
- cryptographic algorithms
- CPA attack
- correlation power analysis
- Correlation
- AES-256-CBC