Visible to the public "Side channel power analysis of an AES-256 bootloader"Conflict Detection Enabled

Title"Side channel power analysis of an AES-256 bootloader"
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2015
AuthorsC. O'Flynn, Z. David Chen
Conference Name2015 IEEE 28th Canadian Conference on Electrical and Computer Engineering (CCECE)
Date PublishedMay
PublisherIEEE
ISBN Number978-1-4799-5829-0
Accession Number15239720
KeywordsAES-256 bootloader, AES-256-CBC, Correlation, correlation power analysis, CPA attack, cryptographic algorithms, cryptography, Encryption, Entropy, firmware files, Hamming weight, initialization vector, microcontrollers, Power measurement, power measurements, pubcrawl170102, SCA, secure bootloader, side channel attacks, side channel power analysis, Synchronization
Abstract

Side Channel Attacks (SCA) using power measurements are a known method of breaking cryptographic algorithms such as AES. Published research into attacks on AES frequently target only AES-128, and often target only the core Electronic Code-Book (ECB) algorithm, without discussing surrounding issues such as triggering, along with breaking the initialization vector. This paper demonstrates a complete attack on a secure bootloader, where the firmware files have been encrypted with AES-256-CBC. A classic Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) attack is performed on AES-256 to recover the complete 32-byte key, and a CPA attack is also used to attempt recovery of the initialization vector (IV).

URLhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7129369
DOI10.1109/CCECE.2015.7129369
Citation Key7129369