A One-Way Proof-of-Work Protocol to Protect Controllers in Software-Defined Networks
| Title | A One-Way Proof-of-Work Protocol to Protect Controllers in Software-Defined Networks |
| Publication Type | Conference Paper |
| Year of Publication | 2016 |
| Authors | Li, Jingrui, Wolf, Tilman |
| Conference Name | Proceedings of the 2016 Symposium on Architectures for Networking and Communications Systems |
| Publisher | ACM |
| Conference Location | New York, NY, USA |
| ISBN Number | 978-1-4503-4183-7 |
| Keywords | Attack, composability, defense, denial-of-service, Internet, Metrics, network control systems, network control systems security, networked control systems, pubcrawl, Resiliency, security |
| Abstract | Connection setup in software-defined networks (SDN) requires considerable amounts of processing, communication, and memory resources. Attackers can target SDN controllers with simple attacks to cause denial of service. We proposed a defense mechanism based on a proof-of-work protocol. The key characteristics of this protocol, namely its one-way operation, its requirement for freshness in proofs of work, its adjustable difficulty, its ability to work with multiple network providers, and its use of existing TCP/IP header fields, ensure that this approach can be used in practice. |
| URL | http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2881025.2889481 |
| DOI | 10.1145/2881025.2889481 |
| Citation Key | li_one-way_2016 |